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1 \ INTRODUCTION
This work is not a chemical dissertation; rather it
is an attempt to compile and present data which will serve
to impress upon the minds of readers the vital importance
of the economic aspects of the world nitrate situation. A
few chemical terms must of necessity be used, especially
in the description of certain processes; but it must be
clearly understood that all such terms, together with
whatever discussion they may necessitate, are to be subor-
dinated to the principal theme, which is economic.
For non-technical readers, a brief definition of the
term NITRATES might be apropos. Chemically speaking, ni-
trates consist of the salts and esters of nitric acid.
Both the salts and the esters are formed by the replace-
ment of the acid hydrogen of the acid; salts resulting
when it is replaced by a metal or metal-like radical, and
esters resulting when the replacement is by a hydro-carbon
radical. When the procedure is reversed, nitric acid is
produced from the nitrates.
The Importance of nitric acid in modern industrial
chemistry is well-recognized; thus we may easily see the
economic importance of proper control and development of
world supplies of nitrates. But nitric acid itself is
not the only, nor even the best-known, product made from
nitrates. The number of such products is legion; some of
the most important will later be described in detail.
U
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Perhaps the most important uses for nitrates are in
the manufacture of fertilizers and explosives; at least,
these are the best-known uses. It is with these two in-
dustries in mind that modern commercial and industrial
world powers are constantly vying with each other in the
production and control of nitrates. It is this constant
international competition for superiority and self-suffi-
ciency of production that has resulted in the current
state of over-production and low prices throughout the
world. Productive capacity in this industry is not lim-
ited or controlled to any great extent by the economic
law of supply and demand; each nation wishes to produce
an amount equal to its own requirements, so that in case
of war it will not be dependent upon other countries for
ingredients of explosives. Thi3 desire for self-suffi-
ciency has resulted in an exportable surplus in practi-
cally every producing nation, due to the fact that peace-
time requirements are but a fraction of the war-time a-
mounts for which plant capacity exists at present.
The international aspects of the nitrate situation
have changed very radically since 191 2*-. Prior to that
year, natural Chilean saltpeter was practically the only
commercial source of nitrates. With the disrupting of
ocean communication during the War, and with the desires
of the powers to have their own sources of nitrates near
at hand, the sensational rise of synthetic nitrogen pro-
ducts began to take place. This rise has been so rapid
in relation to world consumption of nitrogen products that
at present the Chilean fields produce only a small part of
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the annual world consumption. Chile's share in world pro-
duction seems to be decreasing year by year.
World competition in this field has of late become so
keen that during the past few years there have been formed
several international agreements creating associations of
the cartel type. The aim of these associations has been
to control either the price or the volume of production,
or both. They have met with varying degrees of success,
as will be explained in the thesis proper.
A diversified means of approach had of necessity to
be adopted in the preparation of this thesis, as I could
find no single report or source that would cover the en-
tire scope of the report. Different phases of the problem
have been previously covered in full by others, but for
information as to the present international situation I
had to rely upon current periodicals. A veritable mine
of such information was found in the OIL
,
PAINT AND DRUG
REPORTER, a trade weekly. It is of course quite natural
to find that no previous study had adequately covered this
exact field; if such a study had been made, the present
thesis would have been superfluous.
Part I of the thesis will discuss the various uses
of nitrates, as well as the various types of nitrogenous
materials that are used for the different purposes. Such
uses will as far as possible be traced back to show their
historical developement . It will be shown how men of dif-
ferent nationalities have combined their research knowledge
. c*^ ... v
Vin these fields to further the advancement of our world
civilization. The men of no one country were responsible
for the entire fund of knowledge in any particular field;
such advancement as was made was on an international basis.
Part II will discuss the present international situa-
tion of supply and demand in the nitrate field. It will
show how since 1914 the trend has been away from Chile as
the source of supply for the world demand; it will further
attempt to show the reasons, both economic and political,
for this change in the trend. Also in this section will
be discussed the results of this change in trend, as well
as the results of the present condition of over-production.
Part III will consist of an attempt to forecast the
future of the industry. There are at present two opposing
factors in the Industry: the political, which desires e-
conomic self-sufficiency for all great powers, with war-
time capacity in each; and the economic, where reason dic-
tates that productive capacity must of necessity be re-
duced, in order to bring the supply back into a normal re-
lationship with the demand. Any forecast for this indus-
try must of necessity be a forecast as to which of the two
factors will in the end dominate the other the economic,
or the political.
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PART I
USES OF NITRATES

2SECTION A FERTILIZERS
HISTORY OF USE MAJOR INVESTIGATIONS
EARLIEST WORK IN ENGLAND . 1660:
Up until 1660 the use of nitrates as fertilizers was
absolutely unknown. In that year an English nobleman
made experiments with a solution of saltpeter in water.
He found that a corn crop fertilized with this mixture,
even though planted in seemingly barren ground, yielded
a greater harvest than a similar crop, unfertilized, which
was planted in much better ground. This experiment, even
though of great practical importance, could not be the
basis for any extensive research, due to the lack of know-
ledge that existed at that time of both the structure of
plants and of the principles of chemistry. However, it
showed that people were beginning to awaken to the possi-
bility of enriching their ground so as to enable the same
plot of land to produce greater crops.
WORK OF DE SAUSSURE (FRANCE). 1804;
The work of the French chemist Theodore de Saussure
presented the world with the first real light upon the
subject of fertilization of plants by means of nitrates.
It was de Saussure who first realized the significance of
the ash ingredient of plants, and that plant life was not
possible without such ingredients. He further showed that
it was only the ash of plants which was gotten from the
soil. Certain contemporary authors had contended that

3because mineral substances were present in plants in only
very minute quantities, such substances were necessary to
the life of the plants. De Saussure refuted that state-
ment in his investigations
.
(1)
VON LIE3IG- IN ENGLAND;
The reports of Justus von Liebig to the British Asso-
ciation in 1840 and 1842 were destined to establish the
foundation of the modern chemical fertilizer Industry. He
was the first person to present to the English the impor-
tance of having soluble mineral substances in the soil.
Von Liebig also sought to impress upon English minds the
value of the use of nitrogen for fertilizing crops.
(1) The following quotations from de Saussure will
serve to show his method of reasoning. Quoted from the
original French: p262: "Plusieurs auteurs ont admis que
les substances minerales qu'on trouve dans les veg^taux,
n'y sont qu 1 accidentelles, y nullement necessaires a leur
existence; parce qu'ils ne les contiennent qu'en tres-pe-
tite quantity. Cette opinion ... n'eat point demontr<§e.
Leur petite quantity n'est pas un indlce de leur inutil-
ity ... Mais 1 ' observation ... prouve que plusieurs
plantes requierent un aliment salln, mais qu'il doit etre
modlfie* dans sa quantit^eet dans ses principes, suivant la
nature du vegetal qui doit l'absorber." p270: "Les
racines des plantes absorbent les sels et les extraits,
mais en moins grande raison que l'eau qui tient ces sels
et ces extraits en dissolution.... Un vegetal n'absorbe
v
pas en mime proportion toutes les substances contenues a-
la-fois dans une meme dissolution; il en fait des secre-
tions particulieres; il absorbe en general, en plus grande
quantity, les substances dont les solutions s£parees sont
moins vlsqueuses." p280: "L'analyse demontre que tous les
principes dominants dans les cendres, sont contenus dans
le terreau, et que sa partie soluble, p^netre seule dans
le vegetal, contient ces principes en plus grande propor-
tion, que la partie insoluble... Leur existence, dans la
plants, n'a rlen done que de natural, et leur absence y
serait bien plus digne d' ^tonnement . " de Saussure, "Re-
cnerches Chimiques Sur La V^g^tation" . 1804, Paris.
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The more important conclusions of von Liebig are as
follows
:
"Plants invariably contain a certain number of miner-
al substances, and, in fact, always the same substances;
the nature and quality, or the varying proportions of
which are ascertained by finding the composition of the
ashes of the plants. The mineral substances found in the
ashes were originally ingredients of the soil, all fertile
soils containing a certain amount of them; they are never
wanting in any soil in which plants thrive."
"It is therefore certain, that one of the conditions
of fertility in a soil is the presence in it of certain
mineral constituents."
"Animal manure not only supplies the plants with a
certain amount of their mineral and atmospheric food, but
also provides them, in carbolic acid and ammoniacal salts,
those substances which are the most indispensable for the
introduction into the vegetable organism of the mineral
constituents which by themselves are insoluble in water."
"If the soil is to retain permanently its fertility,
the mineral constituents removed in the crops must be re-
stored to it from time to time, at shorter or longer in-
tervals, or, in other words, the original composition of
the soil must be restored."
"If, during the formation of the leaves and roots,
two plants of the same kind are supplied with unequal
amounts of food in the same time, their increase in mass
is unequal. It is greater in that plant which in that
time received more food: its developement is accelerated.
The same inequality in mass is observed, when the same
food is applied to both plants in equal quantity, but in
different conditions of solubility... The conditions which
shorten the time required for its growth are the same as
those which detirmlne its increase in mass.
"(2)
PROGRESS IN AMERICA SINC5 WORLD WAR:
The United States Department of Agriculture is con-
stantly making field tests of various fertilizers in dif-
ferent parts of the country. It wishes to find out which
fertilizers are best for specific crops, and which concen-
(2) Justus von Liebig "Principles of Agricultural Chem-
istry"—1855—pp 17, 18, 21, 27, 29.

tration gives the best results in each case. Such exper-
iments will serve to increase the quality of our crops, as
well as their quantity, thus giving them a more favorable
place in the markets at home and abroad.
Since the 'far there has come about in this country, as
well as in the rest of the world, an increase in the con-
centration of commercial fertilizers. This movement has
been sponsored primarily by the United States Bureau of
Soils. Formerly many commercial fertilizers had food
content of not greater than 12$, but those times are past.
The change in this regard has been brought about by the
increase in freight rates and by the increase in storage
charges since the War. It is no longer profitable to man-
ufacture and ship fertilizers of low food content; all
shipments must have as great value as possible in the
smallest bulk.
Another movement in the same direction has been the
standardization of grades of fertilizers. The year 1923
marked the culmination of this campaign. The movement was
supported both by the fertilizer industry and by the agri-
cultural colleges and experimental stations. The leading
manufacturers and practically all of the states using
fertilizer agreed upon some thirty standard fertilizers,
which it was believed would satisfy most requirements.
The new standard fertilizers were found to be more effi-
cient and economical than the multitude of brands formerly
employed by agriculturists. (3)
(3) "New International Yearbook" for 1923 "Fertilizers".
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NATURAL NITRATES;
GUANO
:
This fertilizer material is composed of the
excrement of sea fowl, and is much prized because of its
high nitrogenous content. The greatest supply comes from
a chain of very dry islands off the coast of Peru. Dry
climates are needed for commercial exploitation of this
type of manure; the least trace of rainfall or other damp-
ness in the air will tend to wash much of the mineral mat-
ter from the guano. In this respect the climate of the
Peruvian islands is ideal; rainfall is there an unknown
quantity.
Fish-guano, while it has some manufacturing done to
it, is practically a natural manure. It is prepared by
pressing, drying and pulverizing the heads of fish. This
fertilizer has practically the same amount of nitrogen in
the form of ammonia as has the Peruvian guano about 10% .
CHILE SALTPETER: This substance, nitrate of soda,
was for many years the chief world source of nitrogen for
commercial purposes. As the name indicates, the main de-
posits are to be found in Chile, although there is a small
quantity in the neighboring portions of Peru and Bolivia.
Early in 1929 there were reports in newspapers of
South Africa of deposits of nitrate of soda being found in
the Gibeon district. These reports were later confirmed.
An outline was made of deposits covering 10,000 square
miles, and proclamations were issued to include 32,000

square miles in the nitrate area. These proclamations
also prohibited all further prospecting. The deposits
were said to contain about 16% nitrate of soda. (4)
There are some deposits of nitrate of soda here in
the United States, but they are not of commercial impor-
tance. The Geological Survey Bulletins numbers 820 and
838 serve to point out this fact. The conclusions were
reached only after twenty years of Investigation on the
part of the Survey, covering deposits in twenty-three
states of the country. The great bulk of the caliche or
natural material contained less than two percent of ni-
trate of soda; much of it contained less than one percent.
It was stated that one aim of the reports was to warn the
public against certain stock-promotion schemes based upon
supposed deposits of nitrates. (5)
The mining and treatment of natural sodium nitrate
is described as follows:
"The fact that the nitrate is found in thin, irreg-
ular patches at or near the surface leads naturally and
properly to open-cut mining.
Where the area of any patch is sufficiently exten-
sive and the grade of caliche is consistently high enough
to permit regular working, the ground is opened by trench-
es. These are carried forward laterally across the ground
to be mined, the caliche and overourden being drilled and
blasted ahead of the trench, broken, and hand sorted in
it, the waste rock piled back of the trench with the cali-
che on top, and finally the caliche hauled from there to
the crushers along temporary narrow-gage railway lines con-
necting with main rield lines ramifying over the property.
When the patches are too small or the grade too irregular
(4) oil, Paint and Drug Reporter Feb. 11, 1929; p 48
Aug. 19, 1929; p 51.
(5) Ibid. Apr. 27, 1931—
-p 50; June 6, 1932—p 51.

6the material is won by the older style of mining, which
involves working small pits from which the nitrate is col-
lected by carts.
Formerly all the drilling and blasting was done en-
tirely by hand, and carts were used to bring all the ni-
trate to the main field lines. Now, at many of the pro-
perties, air drills have been introduced for breaking up
the big blocks, and efforts are being made to use them in
the first breaking up of the ground as well. At present
the latter work is still accomplished at most oficinas by
putting down with hand jump drills and small "pop" shots a
hole 6 to 8 inches in diameter, chambering it below the
nitrate bed, and blasting with some 300 or more pounds of
a cheap slow-burfiing black powder made locally. Since the
effect of such a shot is to heave the ground up in blocks
of as much as 12 feet in diameter, the necessity of secon-
dary blasting is evident. It is not the purpose of the
mining to break the rock fine, as this increases the loss.
The large blocks are broken with 25-pound sledges and the
caliche separated from the barren rock by hand sorting in
the pit.
***In special cases drag-line scrapers and steam sho-
vels have been introduced.***
Transportation of the caliche to the treatment plant
is by field railway lines of various gages. In part carts
are still used, but now rarely except to gather caliche
mined in small patches or from outlying parts of the pro-
perty. There is a distinct trend away from carts and to-
ward direct loading. There is a further tendency toward
larger central treatment plants drawing caliche from
greater distances and the use of heavier locomotives and
rolling stock. Formerly haulage of one-half mile and a
mile and a half was the usual limit. Now caliche is
hauled as much as 25 miles in heavy trains of 15-ton cars
running on well-built main lines. When necessary, cali-
che is brought to the main lines over temporary 60-centi-
meter tracks in 7-ton side-dump horse-drawn cars.
***With the exception of one plant, all those in the
nitrate region that are in regular operation are built for
the Shanks process. At the Delaware oficine of the Du
Pont Nitrate Co., a modification of this, designed by Mr.
A. W. Allen and known as the Allen process, has now been
in successful use for more than a year.***
Essentially the Shanks process is one of treatment of
coarse crushed rock by countercurrent leaching, the aque-
ous solution being brough up in strength and temperature
to boiling point, decanted, cooled, and returned for reuse.
The caliche contains a number of water-soluble salts, of
which sodium nitrate and sodium chloride are most impor-
tant. It happens that the solubility of sodium nitrate
increases with rise in temperature at a much higher rate
than does that of sodium chloride. Indeed, at the higher
temperatures involved, the solution in the presence of

9caliche will precipitate sodium chloride and take up ad-
ditional nitrate. The nitrate rich solution is then drawn
off, clarified, and allowed to cool. As the temperature
falls nitrate crystallizes out, the other salts being re-
tained in solution. The excess solution is drawn off, the
nitrate drained or put through centrifugals, and the liquor
sent back for reuse. These are the essentials of the pro-
cess; but there are many minor complications and side pro-
cesses such as those involved in precipitating "high potas-
sium" nitrate, "96 percent nitrate", "98 percent" nitrate,
recovery of iodine as a by-product, hastening precipita-
tion, recovery of heat, and other similar matters. In
general, however, the plants are operated to produce the
standard "95 percent" nitrate with the minimum of loss in
the refuse *** and the highest speed of treatment (to se-
cure plant capacity) consistent with making acceptable
recoveries. "(6)
The Shanks process of refining, referred to above,
has been employed since 1878. It is now being superceded
in many oficlnas by the Guggenheim process, which has been
developed within the last few years. In this latter pro-
cess the caliche is treated with eoul or warm water and
later precipitated by refrigeration. Heat for the process
is derived from water from the Diesel engines that are
used for power in the plants. A granulation plant was in-
stalled in 1928.
With the Guggenheim method the entire process is me-
chanized; even hand-sorting at the field is eliminated.
A much lower grade of caliche can be used than would be
possible under the Shanks system. The Guggenheim process
results in a free-flowing 98»5 percent pure nitrate, which
is very easy to apply to the soil. It is also claimed
that this process reduces the cost of production one-third,
making it more economical to use in the long run. (7)
(6) Bain and Mulliken, "THE COST OF CHILEAN NITRATE", pt. I
(7) Bulletin of Pan American Union; 65:513-14, May, 1931.
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An enormous drawback to the use of the Guggenheim
process to any great extent is the great cost of the re-
quired installation. The patent rights are all closely
held by a small group another barrier to extension of
use
.
"FIXED NITROGEN":
The element nitrogen makes up about four-fifths of
all the air wnich surrounds us. The manner by which it
could be taken from the air and placed into a commer-
cially useful form had long baffled scientists. The Ger-
mans were the first people to successfully solve the prob-
lem. They used this form of nitrogen with great success
during the War when they were cut off from the Chilean
fields. Nitrogen itself could easily be extracted from
the air, but in its natural state it was of little com-
mercial Use. The remedy to the situation lay in com-
bining the nitrogen with other elements which acted in
the role of "carriers". This process of combining the
nitrogen with other elements is known technically as
fixation, and the product is "fixed nitrogen". There are
three main methods of fixation: the arc process, the cy-
anamide process, and the direct synthetic ammonia process.
ARC PROCESS: "In the arc process the basis of the
chemical change is the partial conversion at high temper-
atures of nitrogen and oxygen to form nitric oxide. Air
is passed rapidly through a zone of exceedingly high tem-
perature produced in an electric arc furnace. Nitric ox-
ide, NO, i3 produced, which on cooling in the presence of
the accompanying oxygen forms nitrogen dioxide, N0 2 « The
nitrogen dioxide produced is absorbed in water, giving
dilute nitric acid. This is the only one of the three
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processes which produces nitric acid directly In the
arc process the existing air mixture is used, the only
pre treatment of the air consisting of the removal of the
carbon dioxide and water vapor ingredients." (8)
The arc process has been carried out for the most
part in the Scandinavian countries, where there is enor-
mous waterpower sufficient to cheaply generate the great
wattage of electricity required for the arcs.
CYANAMIDE PROCESS: "in the cyanamlde process nitro-
gen is fixed by bringing it in contact with finely pow-
dered calcium carbide heated to 1,000° C. Calcium cyan-
amlde, CaCN2 , is formed.... It is first necessary to ef-
fect the isolation of the nitrogen component from the
other ingredients, in other words, to remove the oxygen
as well as the water vapor and carbon dioxide." (9)
Cyanamlde has about a 16% nitrogen content. It is
slower acting than some other fertilizers, as it must de-
compose in the soil before becoming available to the
plants. It is not well suited to either saturated or
sandy soils. (10)
DIRECT SYNTHETIC AMMONIA PROCESS; "...accomplishes
the direct synthesis of ammonia, NH-,, from nitrogen and
hydrogen by passing a compressed mixture of these two
gasses over a catalyst at high temperature. Iron oxide
is said to be the best catalyst base known at present.
The gas coming off is a mixture of nitrogen, hydrogen,
and ammonia, from which the ammonia is removed by absorp-
tion or refrigeration, and the other gasses are returned
to the catalyst for further ammonia formation. There are
a number of methods of operation of the direct synthetic
ammonia process, which have come to be called processes.
These include the Haber-Bosch, Claude, Casale, Fauser, and
other processes. In all of these processes, however, ni-
trogen is fixed with hydrogen in the presence of a catalyst.
In this method also it is first necessary to effect the
isolation of the nitrogen component from the rest of the
atmosphere before fixation." (11)
(8) Reprinted from U.S. Bureau of Mines Information Cir-
cular 6385 p. 10.
(9) Ibid.
(10) Encyclopaedia Americana Vol. 11, p. 146.
(11) Same as (8) , (9)
.
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In the direct synthetic ammonia process, the largest
single item of cost is that of hydrogen; some cheaper
source of hydrogen must be found before the cost of pro-
duction can be materially reduced. (12)
One of the chief difficulties in the way of using
synthetic ammonia fertilizers is the problem of finding
a suitable carrier. Phosphoric acid has been used to
some extent, but little progress has been made in this
country in this line of research. (13)
BY-PRODUCT NITROGEN;
"In the coking of coal the nitrogen contained in the
original coal becomes distributed between the coke, the
tar, and the gas. The only portion valuaole for its ni-
trogen content is the gas, in wnich the nitrogen occurs
chiefly as ammonia. This ammonia is recovered by washing
with water or with sulphuric acid and forms either ammonia
liquor or the compound ammonia sulphate, according to
which of the two liquids is used as the washing agent. "(14)
AMMONIA-COMPOUND FERTILIZERS;
"Sulphate of ammonia
. (NH^-JoSO^.* wb-en pure is an odor-
less white salt, soluble in water, which contains a little
over 21 per cent of nitrogen. The commercial grade varies
in color from white to gray and brown and contains 20 to
21 per cent of nitrogen. The average analysis of commer-
cial by-product sulphate of ammonia produced in the United
States is said toshow. .. 20.56 to 20.50 per cent of nitro-
gen " (15)
"Ammonium sulphate-nitrate is a double salt of ammon-
ium sulphate and ammonium nitrate manufactured in Germany
and Italy for fertilizer purposes and sold under the trade
name of "Leunasalpeter" . It contains about 26 per cent of
nitrogen, about one-fourth of which is in the nitrate form
and the remainder of which is ammonia nitrogen. "(16)
"Potassium ammonium nitrate. . .contains about 16 per
cent of nitrogen... Prepared in Germany and marketed...
for fertilizer use." (17)
(12) American Yearbook, 1928 (13) Ibid, 1926.
(14) Bureau of Mines Information Circular 63S5 p. 10.
(15) Ibid. p. 25. (16) Ibid. p. 24. (17) Ibid. p. 25.
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OTHER NITROGENOUS FERTILIZERS:
Calcium nitrate, or nitrate of lime, contains about
17 per cent of nitrogen, although, the commercial form
usually contains merely about 15 percent. This substance
absorbs and holds water very easily; because of this hy-
groscopic nature, it must be shipped in drums of water-
proof bags. (18)
There is also a synthetic nitrate of soda, containing
practically sixteen and one-half per cent of nitrogen.
This synthetic product is manufactured for the most part
in Germany and the United States. (19)
Germany has within the last few years put on world
markets a series of hignly concentrated complete ferti-
lizers. They contain various amounts of nitrogen, potash,
and phosphorus all necessary for good plant growth. (20)
Urea is the most concentrated of all the nitrogen-
containing compounds used as fertilizers. The commercial
grade contains aoout 46 per cent of nitrogen. One of the
great American companies manufacturing synthetic urea
sells almost Its its entire output to other makers of com-
pound fertilizers.
The trend in nitrogenous fertilizers seems to be to-
ward substances which either contain other necessary sub-
stances besides nitrogen, or else present the nitrogen in
more than one way in the same mixture.
(18) Bureau of Mines Information Circular 6355, p. 24.
(19) Ibid.
(20) Ibid. p. 25.
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SECTION B EXPLOSIVES
Perhaps tne first thing that comes into our minds
when we think of explosives is a thought of war. That is
where explosives have been employed in their most specta-
cular uses. Hov/ever that may be, modern peace-time uses
are doing much to rival in grandeur and magnitude the
most impressive war-time displays. Modern engineers have
so controlled explosives that they can make the substances
do their bidding explicitly, from the felling of a giant
brick chimney to the preparing of sites for huge dams or
tunnels. The nature and strength of the charges are fig-
ured out in advance with mathmatical precision, and the
results are calculated with perfect exactness. Man has
thus made explosives his servants in constructive as well
as in destructive enterprises.
The evolution of explosives through the ages presents
an interesting story:
"Black powder was gradually developed from "Greek
fire", and was known before anyone thought of using it in
firearms. It was originally composed of more or less in-
timate mixtures of potassium nitrate, with charcoal, resin,
native paraffin, petroleum containing earth and other com-
bustible substances, and was used partly for fireworks and
partly for the production of fire and smoke for military
purposes. The first employment of such mixtures as pro-
pellants was probably in the latter half of the thirteenth
century. For six hundred years black powder remained the
sole chemical propellant, until finally in the last ten
years of the nineteenth century it was replaced by the
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gelatinized smokeless powders. At present black powder is
used to a very limited extent for ballistic purposes, most-
ly in the form of sporting powders.
The oldest composition of black powder from potassium
nitrate, charcoal and sulphur has undergone very few chan-
ges in the course of time Various attempts have been
made to substitute the various components of black powder
by other substances having similar properties. Thus, po-
tassium nitrate has been replaced by sodium nitrate, ba-
rium nitrate, and even ammonium nitrate, in spite of its
deliquescence in moist air. "(21)
"Almost all smokeless powders consist mainly of ni-
trocellulose in a more or less completely gelatinized con-
dition Nitroglycerine-containing powders have nitro-
glycerine and nitrocellulose as the principal ingredients.
Both explosive substances are most Intimately combined in
the gelatinized condition." (22)
"In the course of experiments to find a more suitable
absorbent for nitroglycerine...., A. Nobel (Engl. Patent
No. 4l, 791) discovered, in 1875, that a certain kind of
collodion cotton even in small quantities can transform
liquid nitroglycerine to a gelatinized mass which Is a
much more powerful explosive than guhr dynamite, leaves
no solid residue on explosion and yields no nitroglycerin
in the presence of moisture. This preparation was called
(21) "EXPLOSIVES"---Dr. H . Brunswig---Ch. IX, Sect. 182,
p. 237.
(22) Ibid. Sect. 183, p. 242.
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"Explosive gelatin".
Explosive gelatin consists of from 90 to 93 per cent
nitroglycerine and from 7 to 10 per cent of a special kind
of collodion cotton. These are united by warming and stir-
ring into a homogeneous, transparent and elastic gum
Explosive gelatin is one of the most powerful of ex-
plosives and is, therefore, suited for shattering very
solid and tenacious material. It is much less sensitive
to shock and friction than guhr dynamite." (23)
SECTION C ---OTHER USES OF NITRATES
Nitrate of soda is used in the production of dyes,
sulphuric and nitric acids, as material for the manufac-
ture of potassium nitrate, as a chemical reagent and as
a flux in industry.
Nitric acid is used in refining metals, in brass and
other metal finishing, in dyeing, etching copper plates
and printers' rolls, manufacture of jewelry, electroplat-
ing, photoengraving, manufacture of explosives, manufac-
ture of dyestuffs and intermediates, cotton printing,
manufacture of foodstuffs, and for nitrating cotton.
Potassium nitrate is used in the manufacture of glass
and ceramics, matches, pyrotechnics, fertilizers, candles,
for pickling candle wicks, pickling meats, processing to-
bacco, and also in medicine.
(23) "EXPLOSIVES"-—Dr. H. Brunswig---Ch. IX, Sect. 213.
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Man is constantly making advances in the field of
chemistry, and it is probable that many new and enlarged
uses will be found for nitrates in the future. Chemists
have recently discovered that Nitrate of soda has great
potential use as an industrial sanitary agent:
"Cheap and effective means of chemically treating
industrial waste with nitrate of soda previous to its
discharge into streams, preventing pollution, has been
practically applied by a Boston engineering concern, which
specializes in sanitary work. Tests with the new Amer-
ican synthetic nitrate of soda, recently put on the mar-
ket, are under way in various parts of the United States.
Until recently, lime and chlorine were the two most-
used chemicals in canneries, paper mills, and wood-scour-
ing plants, where the waste makes an objectionable odor
when it decomposes.
The new use of nitrate of soda was discussed recent-
ly at a meeting of the American Chemical Society at Colum-
bus, Ohio.
The nitrate of soda acts as an oxydizlng agent. It
furnishes active atoms of oxygen, which do the oxydizlng.
Then it takes up the inactive atoms of oxygen in the waste
solution, making them active. These atoms are given up to
do oxydizlng work, and the process continues. The amount
of nitrate depends upon the kind of waste. Generally
there is needed one pound of nitrate for each thousand gal-
lons of waste water. 11 (24)
It will thus be seen that there is hardly any major
industry which cannot profitably use nitrates in some form
or another; they form one of the bases of our modern in-
dustrial civilization.
(24) Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter; May 26, 1930; p. 7b"
.
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INTERNATIONAL SITUATION
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WORLD SITUATION
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There are three outstanding features in the present
world nitrate situation: a rapidly-increased production,
a less rapidly-increased consumption, and a consequent
over-supply on all markets. The main reason for the in-
crease in production has been the previously-mentioned de-
sire of all countries to become as self-sufficient as pos-
sible, in case of war. Fixed nitrogen is the class which
has shown the greatest increase. V/hereas in 1900 the pro-
duction of this material had barely started, it now repre-
sents the larger portion of world production. World's con-
sumption of fixed nitrogen has increased from 300,000 tons
in 1900 to almost 2,000,000 tons in 1928. (25)
Following is a table showing the world consumption of
the principal forms of nitrates over a period of five
years, the years ending June 30: (26)
Table I
WORLD CONSUMPTION OF NITRATES. (1.000 TONS PUR3 NITR0G-)
1924 1925 1926 1927 192b
Synthetic nitrogen
products 355 450 555 735 900
By-product sulphate
of ammonia 275 275 300 310 350
Chilean nitrates 340 363 323 271 390
Total $70 1,088 1,208 1,316 1,640
(25) American Yearbook 1923
(26) Ackman, Ltd., in half-yearly report; London July 5,
1928. From Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter; July 30, '28

23
The year 1928 was a banner one as far as nitrates
were concerned. For the nitrate year ended June 30, 1926,
production of all forms of nitrates, expressed in terms of
pure nitrogen, increased 420,000 tons, or about 34$. Ac-
cording to a report of the British Sulphate of Ammonia
Federation, Chilean nitrate of soda contributed 190,700
tons to this increase, the other sources contributing
229,000 tons. Total world consumption of nitrates in-
creased 289,300 tons, amounting to about 22$, following
an increase of 54,000 tons, or 4.2$, in the previous year.
The increase in both production and consumption in 1928
was the largest which ever occurred in a single year, the
increase alone being equal to the annual world output of
twenty- five years previously. (27)
Table II shows both production and consumption of
nitrates for both 1927 and the banner year of 1928, the
amounts being expressed in metric tons of pure nitrogen,
for the years ending June 30: (27)
Table II
WORLD PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION OF NITRATES
1927 1928
Total production 1,237,500 1,657,300
Total consumption 1,312,700 1,602,000
Approximate agricul-
tural consumption. 1,200,000 1,450,000
The table shov.*s that even in the banner year con-
sumption increased at a slower rate than did production,
(27) Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter; N 26, 1928 p 51.
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doing nothing to relieve the condition of over-supply
that so characterizes the Industry.
How was the production of the banner year of 1926
attained? Table III shows the percentages of the total
production that was contributed by each of the principal
sources of supply: (28)
Table III
WORLD PRODUCTION OF INORGANIC NITROGEN IN 1925
Chile nitrate 23$
Coke oven nitrogen 22$
Cyanamide nitrogen lh%
Synthetic ammonia and
arc process nitrogen 4l%
Total world production 100%
The above table shows that Chile, which was formerly
practically the sole source of world nitrates, produced in
1928 only about one-fourth of the entire world supply.
The manufactured product has placed Chile in dire straits.
Chilean producers did much to bring on the drasti-
cally low prices that prevailed for nitrates in Europe and
Egypt during the first half of the year 1928. The reduced
prices were by no means the result of a decrease in de-
mand; rather, they came about because of the virtual dump-
ing of Chilean nitrates upon the markets. Feeling the ef-
fect of the synthetic products upon their business, the
producers of Chile began a fight to regain some of their
lost markets a fight that touk the proportions of a
(28) American Xear Book, 1929; p. b81.
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price war. In their rush to open new markets, the Chilean
producers consigned their nitrates to new organizations,
who were not able to handle the tiuge amounts coming in ex-
cept Dy cutting prices. If that were not bad enough, the
amounts consigned were out of all proportion to the amount
of business which might reasonably have been expected. In
spite of the resulting low prices, consumption was not
speeded up people kept waiting for still lower prices
which they thought would be the result of the war. (29)
Production and consumption of nitrates for the year
1929 were more nearly balanced. In that year the total
world production, both of natural and synthetic materials,
amounted to 2,365,000 metric tons; while the consumption
was 2,265,000 metric tons. It is true that supply still
kept well ahead of demand; yet tne discrepancy was not as
great as it had been in other years. (30)
For the year 1929 we also have specific figures rela-
tive to the world use of the Casale process for the making
of synthetic ammonia. (31) In December of 1929 there were
22 plants with an aggregate daily capacity of 901 metric
tons of anhydrous ammonia operating in the world. That
compared with 18 plants of 655 tons of daily capacity in
December of 1927. The increases per country in metric
tons of capacity per day since 1927 were: Belgium, 56;
France, 49; Germany, 60; Canada, 8; and Japan, 100 tons.
(29) Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter; Jl 30, 1928; p. 37
(30) American Year Book, 1929; p. 315
(31) Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter; Jan 20, 1930; p. 44
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Table IV shows the number of tons of daily capacity
of Casale plants in various countries in December of 1929,
as well as proposed increases in production in each one.
Table IV
ACTUAL AND PROPOSED CASALE AMMONIA CAPACITY OF WORLD IN
DECEMBER OF 1929
Daily capacity Proposed increase
Country (metric tons) in capacity (M.T)
Italy 41 16
Belgium 80 180
Canada 8
Dalmatia 48
France 388 8
Germany 60 90
Japan 262 200
Russia 24 24
Switzerland 23
United States 15
World Total 901 566
Speaking of the year 1929 in particular, the American
Casale Company stated that it had been proven that the
process operated with hydrogen from coke-oven gas or from
water gas, as successfully as with that derived from the
electrolysis of water, for wbich the process was original-
ly intended. Of the plants using the process, 14 used
coke-oven gas hydrogen, 3 used water gas hydrogen, and 1
used by-product hydrogen. In plants using coke-oven gas
hydrogen, the rated production capacity of casale units
had actually been exceeded by quantities ranging from 25

27
to 50 per cent in continuous operation. These experiments
in using different kinds of hydrogen in the process are in
line with previously-mentioned endeavors to find a cheaper
source of hydrogen that being the only way by which the
cost of the synthetic ammonia process may be decreased.
Table V, giving statistics for the world's Fauser
process ammonia plants in December of 1931, may be com-
pared with the Casale table (IV) on page 26. Information
for Table V was sent to the Department of Commerce by the
Trade Commissioner at Rome. (32) Daily capacities are
given for each country in metric tons:
Table V
WORLD FAUSER AMMONIA CAPACITY---DECEMBER. 1931
Country
Number of
Dlants
Daily capacity
(metric tons)
Italy 5 180
Holland 2 270
Poland 2 125
Belgium 2 150
Germany 1 15
Sweden
Japan
1 15
1 70
Russia 1 100
Canada 1 50
World Total 16 1,005
The general world situation in the field of nitrates
(32) Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter; Jan 25, '32; p. 22
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for 1931 was not very encouraging. In that year, the total
sales corresponded to only 35$ of total productive capac-
ity (against 7b% in 1929), and to only 5&% of production
(against 30% in 1929). The following tables will show at
a glance the comparative figures for the years 1929, 1930
and 1931: (33)
Table VI
CAPACITY, PRODUCTION AND SALES OF NITRATES IN WORLD
(in millions of tons of nitrogen)
1929 1930 1931
Capacity 2.5 2.
a
3.2
Production 2.4 2. 1.9
Sales 1.9 1.6 1.1
Table VII
RELATIVITY OF PRODUCTION, CAPACITY AND SALES OF
NITRATES
1929 1930 1931
Production : Capacity 96% 75% 60%
Sales : Capacity 76% 57% 35%
Sales : Production 30% 76% 5&%
The first table (VI) shows that capacity alone showed
an increase in the three years; both production and sales
taking sharp drops, the latter falling off almost one-
half. Likewise it will be seen that each one of the ra-
tios in Table VII has decreased sharply. No explanation
is needed, as the tables tell their own story
(33) Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter; S 5,*32; p. 22.
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For the year ended June 30, 1932 the British Sulphate
of Ammonia Federation (34) stated that the total nitrogen
productive capacity of the world was estimated at about
3,400,000 metric tons exclusive of Chile. It was indica-
ted in the report that the manufactured nitrogen industry
of the world operated during the fiscal year 1932 at ap-
proximately 42$ of capacity. World production of fixed
nitrogen during the year decreased 140,584 metric tons,
or about 8.3$ in actual output. Chilean production de-
creased about 80,000 tons, or 32$; while the rest of the
world's production fell off 60,584 tons, a drop of 4$.
The total production of pure nitrogen for the year was
announced as 1,553,704 metric tons, which compared with
1,694,286 for the previous twelve months, and with
2,203,540 for the fiscal year ending June 38, 1930.
World consumption of pure nitrogen was announced by
the Federation as 1,559,768 metric tons, which, for the
first time in many years, was greater than the production
for that year. Of this total, 138,208 tons was Chilean
nitrate, while 1421,580 tons were of manufactured nitro-
gen. These consumption figures compare with figures for
the 1931 fiscal year, when the total consumption was
which
1,621,305 metric tons, of^ 244, 300 tons were from Chile
and 1,377,005 tons were of manufactured origin. Total
world consumption of nitrates during the fiscal year de-
creased 61,517 metric tons, or 3.75$, folxowing a decrease
of 17$ in the preceding year, and increases of 4$ in 1930,
14% in 1929. and 20% in 1928.
(34) Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter; D 26, '32; p. 15.
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Also from the report of the British Sulphate of Ammon-
ia Federation come figures for the agricultural consump-
tion of nitrates for the nitrate year ended June 30. This
consumption for the year ended in 1932 was aoout 1,409,000
metric tons, compared with a consumption for the same pur-
pose of about 1,4-55,000 metric tons in the preceding year.
The year 1932 also saw the beginning of proceedings
for fraudulent bankruptcy against the directors of the
board of the great European Chemical Holding Company Am-
monium A. G. This concern, with headquarters in Switzer-
land, was created m 192b through the influence of the
Prince of Pless for the purpose of operating various chem-
ical works. It was capitalized at 2,500,000 Swiss francs.
The company, which planned to build nitrogen plants
in Upper Silesia and Poland, found itself in financial
difficulties in 1931. Relief was first sought through
a creditors' agreement, but later a committee had to be
appointed to take charge. In September of 1931, bank-
ruptcy proceedings were started against the company, and
it was found that liabilities exceeded 40,000,000 francs,
Swiss money. (35)
INTERNATIONAL CARTELS:
Because of the world over-production which was so
prevalent, nitrates producers realized that for their own
salvation they must come together in some sort of inter-
national agreement. That was easier said than done, how-
(35) Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter; A 1/32; p. 14.

ever; it proved a difficult task to hold together in com-
mon bonds the diverse interests of producers in various
parts of the world, each with the desire to get the best
possible advantage.
Germany, the world center of the synthetic nitrogen
industry, was the first country to realize the importance
of Imposing some kind of regulation upon the plants. The
result of negotiations was an agreement between certain of
the larger producers as to prices and market quotas. The
members of the German syndicate later made agreements with
manufacturers in Norway, Britain and Italy. (36)
The first great international cartel in the nitrate
industry was formed in 1929. (37) The members were the
I. G. Farbenindustrie A. G. ; the British Imperial Chemi-
cal Industries, Ltd.; and the Chilean producers, repre-
sented by the Minister of Finance of Chile. The object
of the cartel was to promote the use of nitrates in ag-
riculture throughout the world except in the United
States, and to engage in joint advertising. A stabiliza-
tion program for prices was also part of the plan.
Such an agreement had long been planned by the Central
Chamber of Commerce of Chile, which had carried on exten-
sive relations with similar bodies in many countries of
the world. The Chamber had long urged the Nitrates Pro-
ducers' Association to send samples and descriptive lit-
erature to chambers of commerce in world centers of fert-
(36) Bureau of Mines Information Circular 63S5; P« 11.
(37) Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter; Jl 1,'29; p. 21.
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ilizer consumption.
In August of 1930, another synthetic nitrogen cartel
was formed among the European producers. Tb.e principal
member countries were Great Britain, France, Germany, Bel-
gium, Italy, Sweden, Poland and Czechoslovakia. (38) A
few days later the German Nitrogen Syndicate, a member of
the cartel, and acting on behalf of the other members,
signed an agreement with the Chilean natural nitrate
interests
.
The cartel of 1930 embraced 9&% of all European
synthetic production, and 30% of the world output of
natural and synthetic nitrogen. Like the previous car-
tel, the one of 1930 did not include the United States
in its plans.
This cartel aimed to reduce all production to 70%
of capacity. Countries such as France, wtiich were not
producing enough for domestic requirements, might increase
their production; but all European manufacturers were as-
sured of being able to produce up to 70% of capacity with-
out a loss. (39)
The Farbenindustrie, the Imperial Chemical, and the
natural producers all agreed to cut down production. All
exporting was to be in the hands of a central body. Those
countries which were producing at greater than 70% of cap-
acity were to receive no exporting facilities until other
(36) Bureau of Mines Information Circular 6335; p. 11.
(39) Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter; S 22, *30; p. 4b.

countries which, had observed the 10% limit had disposed of
their excess production. A common pool to which all pro-
ducers subscribed amounted to about $10,000,000. The pool
was operated from Basle, Switzerland, where the operating
company was established. Synthetic nitrogen producers of
Europe were to pay to the pool 35 marks for each ton of
nitrogen in respect to 70% of their capacities for tne
year 1931-32; by-product makers and mines were to pay 25
marks for each ton of actual output; and Chilean produc-
ers were to pay one- third of the sum of the payments of
the above-mentioned producers.
The agreement was made retroactive to August 1, 1930.
Besides regulating prices, it aimed to foster trade pro-
motion for nitrates in general. Exports to non-producing
countries were regulated, and a fixed differential was
established between Chilean and synthetic nitrates. (40)
In May of 1930, a European cyanamide cartel was
formed. The U. S. Trade Commissioner at Berlin reported
that all export sales of the cartel were to be handled by
the European Cyanamide Export Co., Ltd. of London. The
cartel embraced producers in Germany, France, Italy, Bel-
gium, Yugoslavia, Scandinavia, Switzerland and Poland.
The agreement provided tnat producers in each of the mem-
ber countries should try to control their own home mar-
kets, and that all exports should be through the common
sales agency. (41)
(40) Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter; A lo,*30; p. 21.
(41) ibid. p. 48.

34
The general nitrogen cartel of 1930 had oeen for a
period of one year only. Bei'ore that year was over, the
members met in conference to see whetner or not they could
agree on a oasis Dy whicn the cartel could oe extended for
another year or longer. Sued an agreement proved to De
impossiole. In the first place, Norway demanded that
France licence imports from Norway of 35,000 tons of cal-
cium nitrate; when France refused, Norway tnreatened to
dump 12,000 tons of the material on the French market.
Germany requested France, Belgium, the Netherlands and
Denmark to restrict or prohibit the importation of nitrate
of soda from Chile; but they refused to do so. France de-
manded a nitrate production quota based on theoretical
military needs, and not upon commercial requirements; Ger-
many would not even discuss tine question. With such di-
versity of opinions among the members, it is no wonder
that they failed to reestablish the cartel. (42) This was
merely another of the outward indications of the trend to-
ward national self-protection in nitrates.
In spite of the failure of the great nitrogen cartel,
the cyanamide syndicate continued to operate. The Trade
Commissioner at Berlin sent word that notice was given to
the effect that the syndicate might be terminated after
June 15, 1931; but even in that event, the individual a-
greements between the countries involved would continue to
be in force. (43) Production was to be cut by the mem-
bers insofar as such cuts were not rendered undesirable by
(42) Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter; A 10, '31; p. 17.
(43) Ibid; S 28, '31; p. 40.
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governmental protective measures, such as prohibitions of
imports of cyanamide. If such prohibitions were made, the
producers would have to maintain full production in order
to satisfy home demands. Because of the nature of the
syndicate, as explained previously, home markets were pro-
tected for all producers.
An ammonia sulphate price cartel was formed in Europe
during April of 1932, in order to raise prices above the
distress levels of the previous winter. Because the
French market was well protected and regulated by law, the
French producers did not enter into the cartel. (44)
Another international nitrogen cartel for the stabil-
ization of prices and markets was formed in Europe in July
of 1932. The members of the pact included producers from
Chile, mostly American-controlled; Great Britain; Germany;
Norway; the Netherlands; Belgium; Poland; Italy; France;
Czechoslovakia; Switzerland and Denmark. (4-5)
In November, 1932, the International Conference on
the Application of Fertilizers was held in Rome. There
was proposed at the meeting the establishment of an inter-
national body to promote the use of chemical fertilizers.
A committee of French, German and Italian delegates was
formed to work out operating details of the proposed In-
stitute. Research was also to be carried out as to me-
thods of application of fertilizers. (46)
(44) Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter; Ap 16,'32; p. 23.
(45) American Yearbook for 1932; p. 344.
(46) Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter; Ap 10, '33; p. 22.
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CHILE
Although Chile is no longer the principal world
source of nitrates, it deserves to be treated first among
the producing countries of the world because of its color-
ful history and valient attempts to regain the world su-
premacy which it lost to the synthetic producers. As the
various attempts were seemingly doomed to failure before
they even began to operate, it is no wonder that they were
uniformly unsuccessful.
We have seen how the World War gave the start to the
synthetic industry; it also, for the time being, benefit-
ted the Chilean producers. The following quotations from
an agreement between the Chilean government and the Brit-
ish Nitrate of Soda Executive in 1918 will serve to show
the extent to which the Allies still relied upon the nat-
ural nitrate fields of Chile for their explosives: (47)
1. "The Nitrate of Soda Executive agrees to purchase,
and the Chilean Government, on behalf of the companies
producing nitrate of soda in Chile and whose names will be
set out in a list to be furnished by the Chilean Govern-
ment to the Nitrate of Soda Executive. .agrees to sell
15,000,000 quintals (approximately 650,000 tons) of nitrate
of soda at the price of 13 shillings 6 pence per quintal
F. A. S. for refined, and 13 shillings F. A. S. for the
ordinary.
"
2. "The Chilean Government agrees on behalf of said
companies as follows:
a. Vendors shall pay export duty on said 650,000 tons
of nitrates.
b. It shall be available for delivery on schedule
from September to December, 1918.
c. In event of failure of delivery .... the Associated
Governments shall be free to go upon the open mar-
ket and purchase nitrate of soda from any or all
of the companies producing nitrate of soda in
(47) Misc. No. 22 (1918) Memorandum of Agreement with Chil-
ean Government; Cd. 914-9; London, H.M. Stationers .
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Chile, enjoying in that event all necessary assistance
from the Chilean Government."
3. "The Chilean Government agrees on its own behalf:
a. To furnish at once a list showing the oflcinas
from which they will obtain the said 660,000 tons of ni-
trate of soda, the quantity each will supply, the quan-
tities already manufactured by the individual oficinas,
and the quantities still to be manufactured by them. This
list shall also show the quantities of oil, coal and bags
at present in possession or under contract of said oflci-
nas .
b. To furnish a list showing the exact dates on which
quantities will be available for delivery at various ports.
d. That purchase and delivery of said 680,000 tons
shall in no way interfere with or delay purchase and de-
livery of all or any other quantities purchased by the ni-
trate of soda Executive.
g. That the Nitrate of Soda Executive. ... shall on the
5th of September, 191b invite offers for nitrate of soda
on the open market at the unconditional rate of 13-6 and
13 shillings, which producers who do not intend to sell
through the medium of the Chilean Government will be at
liberty to accept."
4. "The Nitrate of Soda Executive on behalf of the
Associated Governments agrees as follows:
a. To supply petroleum, coal and bags for the manu-
facture and export of said 680,000 tons of nitrate of
soda. . .
.
g. That Associated Governments have the right to
formulate at some future date, if they so desire, pro-
posals for establishment of credits in all or any of the
countries of the Associated Governments."
6. "The Nitrate of Soda Executive considers it most
desirable that the Chilean government should undertake to
place at the disposal of the Associated Governments the
transports owned by the Chilean government for the car-
riage of nitrate of soda as soon as said transports be-
come available."
•The Chilean government being desirous of comply-
ing witl* the desire of the Nitrate of £oda Executive. ...
,
will assign some of the transports owned by them for the
purpose of the carriage of nitrate of soda to the United
States of America as and when said transports become
available.
"
7. "The Chilean 9-overnment are unable at the present
time to give a definite reply to the request of the Asso-
ciated Governments for an option on the total production
of Chilean nitrate of soda for 1919."
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The Associated Governments were later, without doubt,
very glad that Chile had in the agreement refused to give
them the option on her entire production for the next year.
After the War there came hard times to Chilean nitrate
producers, due both to the sudden decrease in demand and
the fact that many synthetic plants had sprung up during
the preceding few years in order to meet the abnormal de-
mand. The supremacy of Chile as a producer of nitrates
was practically over.
The events of the Chilean nitrate situation will be
presented in chronological order year by year. In that
way they will make a better picture than if they had been
divided up into classifications, with a separate time or-
der for each classification. The great Chilean govern-
ment combination known as "Cosach" will not be discussed
in the present train of events; space will be devoted to
it in following pages. It has been such an important in-
ternational organization that it deserves special mention.
Prices for Chilean nitrate of soda were very high in
1923; they were so high that the United States Department
of Agriculture started an investigation into the methods
of pricing the commodity. It found that all pricing rested
with a London committee made up of British nitrate men.
The Department claimed that such price-fixing caused inef-
ficient production methods, resulting in still higher
prices prices which were prohibitive to many agricultur-
al consumers, or potential consumers. (46)
(48) New International Yearbook for 1923; p. 226.
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The government of Chile placec. an export tax upon all
the nitrates sent out of the country. In 1926 the produc-
ers asked that the tax be reduced, as they claimed that it
made it impossible for them to compete with the synthetic
producers in world markets. To this request the govern-
ment refused to agree; it claimed that metnods and proced-
ure used in the nitrate fields was inefficient, and that
costs should be reduced through introduction of better
technology. (49)
Although Chile, for the nitrate year ended June 30,
1926, contributed only 24% of the world's production for
that period, there was an average increase of 42% in the
world consumption of Chilean nitrates. This 42% resulted
from averaging the following percentage increases: Egypt
and Europe, 30%; United States, 48%; and other countries,
44%. The increase in the use of Chilean nitrate was due
to a 17% drop in price which came about during the year.
It will be remembered that the year 1928 was the banner
year in Chilean production. (50)
The year 1928 was one of combination for Chile. That
year saw the taking over of three English companies by one
of the large Chilean producers, and also the absorption of
a large German producer by an English company. Five
groups of producers controlled about 58% of the total an-
nual capacity of 6,000,000 tons. (51) In 1928 there was
organized the Nitrate Distributors, Ltd., composed of four
(49) American Yearbook for 1926; p. 889.
(50) Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter; N 26, '28; p. 51.
(51) Ibid. Jl 30, '28; p. 37

of the largest companies in the Chilean fields. The new
company was organized to take care of over half of the
Chilean production to be sold on the European and Egyptian
markets. (52) By concentrating their European sales in
this one large outlet company, the Chilean producers were
able to present more of a united front to the synthetic
manufacturers than each producer had been able to do by
himself.
Table VIII shows the percentage of plants in Chile
which were owned by men of various nationalities. (53)
Table VIII
PERCENTAGE OWNERSHIP Or UriiLEAiN 1\I IRATE PLANTS
Yugoslavian 32.2$
British lti.4
British-Chilean 9.2
Chilean 8.5
Spanish 7.2
German 5.2
American 4.6
Spanish-Chilean 3.9
Chilean-Peruvian 2.6
American-Chilean-British 2.6
Peruvian 1.9
Yugoslavian-Chilean 1.3
French-Chilean 1.3
Bolivian .6
Total plants in Chile 100
.
0%
(52) Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter; S 24, '26; p. 17.
(53) Ibid. A 6, '28; p. 73.

The Department of Commerce, in compiling this list,
stressed the fact that the list was one of percentage of
ownership of plants, and that it was in no way related to
the volume of production. The greatest part of the pro-
duction is in the hands of a few large British and Ameri-
can plants. The figures in the table are for the year
1928, although the various percentages probably remain
much the same today.
On April 15, 1928, the Government, while announcing
that there would be no reduction in the export tax for
the coming nitrate year of 1928-29, said that it planned
to co-operate with the home industry. On May 7 came the
announcement that it would grant a subsidy of ± 250,000
for division among the various producers pro rata to their
January to March, 1928 production. The Government more-
over paid a bonus of 8 shillings per metric quintal of
production, and established a fund of 1: 1,500,000 to be
used for the development of the industry. It was planned
to renew the subsidy every three months, but that plan did
not work out. In order to get a subsidy, producers could
not sell below a price of 16 shillings, 4 pence per quin-
tal. Later an announcement was made that the Government
would grant producers an extra bonus equal to any reduc-
tion that might be made in price by the German synthetic
producers when they announced their prices for the coming
season. This bonus was to apply to all unsold nitrates in
hands of producers or initial purchasers afloat or ashore
in ports of destination as of June 30, 1928. It would
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also apply to all nitrates shipped for consumption during
the nitrate year 1928-29. On all contracts made before
the new German price was fixed, the bonus had to be passed
on to buyers; on all subsequent contracts it could be re-
tained by the producers. The Government of Chile planned
to readjust the bonus if there were later reductions in
price by the German synthetic producers. (5^)
The American Society of Agronomy is the sponsor of
the Chile Nitrate of Soda Nitrogen Research Award, which
amounts to $5,000 as a yearly prize. It is annually a-
warded to those North American scientists who have made
great achelvements in studying the relation of nitrogen
to soils and crops. The money came from a fund of the
Chile Nitrate of Soda Education Bureau, and was made a-
vailable for the first time in 192b. The first award,
in December of that year, was divided among three Amer-
icans and one Canadian. (55)
In March of 1929, the Chilean Nitrate Producers'
Association took steps to continue their organization
until June 30, 1939. The selling corporation, which was
organized in 1928, was made a part of the Association,
which thereafter controlled both production and sales of
producers. The nitrates of the Anglo-Chilean Company,
which belonged to the Association but not to the selling
organization, were to be sold by the Association, except
in the United States. (56)
(54) Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter; Jl 30,' 28; p. 37-
(55) Ibid. D 10,' 28; p. 47. Jan 13, '30; p. 50.
(56) Ibid. Ap 15,' 29; p. 46.

In an effort to increase the demand for Chilean ni-
trate of Soda, the Chilean Minister of Finance, the Budget
Officer of the Finance ministry, and the Chief of the Ni-
trate Division of the Department of Finance began in 1929
a world tour of the principal markets for nitrate of soda.
They visited President Hoover in Washington to pay their
respects on April 11, before going to call on importers.
The trip was essentially a goodwill tour. (57)
Chile, in 1929, offered to accept bids for the oper-
ating rights to large nitrate beds in the Nebraska fields.
The Anglo-Chilean Consolidated Nitrate Corporation put in
the highest bid for £i 2,500,000. Rival bidders were
said not to be able to guarantee extraction of 80,000,000
quintals inside of 20 years, which was one of the require-
ments of the bid. The Anglo-Chilean Company, after a sur-
vey of the fields, thought that by means of their Guggen-
heim process they could extract from 100,000,000 to
120,000,000 quintals in that period; therefore, they were
able to bid higher than their rivals. (56)
May 14, 1929 saw the consumation of an agreement
whereby the Grace Nitrate Company transferred a large
Chilean nitrate property to a British Company, the Tara-
paca and Tocapilla Co. Both companies were thereafter
operated by W. R. Grace and Co. Payment for the property
was made by giving the Grace Co. 977,000 shares of 10
shillings each of the Tarapaca and Tocapilla Co. (59)
(57) Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter; Ap 15,' 29; p. 46.
(56) Ibid. My 27, '29; p. 48.
(59) Ibid. Je 3,'29; p. 64.

The Lautaro Nitrate Corporation of Delaware was
formed in 1929 by the Anglo-Chilean Consolidated Nitrate
Company and the Lautaro Nitrate Company of London. The
new company acquired plants and processes which enabled it
to extract practically 100% of the nitrates from the ore,
at a reduction in cost of about 2K)%. The processes were
formerly owned by the Anglo-Chilean Company. The Lautaro
stockholders obtained for their holdings the benefit of
the Guggenheim Process. They traded their equity for
fixed-dividend stock, and released to Guggenheim Brothers
a part of that equity. The Guggenheims in turn agreed to
turn their process over to the Anglo-Chilean Company, in
which they owned the greater part of the stock; and the
Anglo-Chilean Company licensed the Lautaro Company. To
finance the transaction, there was a bond issue of
$32,000,000 floated on the New York Market by the National
City Company the largest bond issue of the year. It was
oversubscribed as soon as it was offered. All of the
2,000,000 shares of common stock of the new company were
owned by the Lautaro Nitrate Corporation. As the Anglo-
Chilean Company owned more than 50% of the Lautaro Com-
pany, it will be seen that the Guggenheim brothers had
a substantial grip upon the nitrate industry of Chile. (60)
Nitrates are being depended upon less and less as a
source of revenue to Chile. As late as 1916, such taxes
made up b0% of national revenue; in 1929 it was only 2h%.
This Is in spite of the fact that the amount of nitrate
taxes collected in the two years was about the same, (bl)
(60) Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter; Je 24,' 29; p. 49.
(61) Bulletin of Pan American Union; May, 1931; p. 515.
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This goes to show that Chile is finding other sources of
revenue for the financing of her government. She is not
yet independent of nitrates, however, as her fortunes go
up or down with the prices of saltpeter.
Chilean production of nitrate of soaa in 1929 was the
highest in history. In that year the country produced
3,237, 594 metric tons, which was 62,770 tons more than
the record year of 1925. Exports for 1929 were 2,541,900
tons, compared with 2,132,y00 tons in 1925. World con-
sumption of Chilean nitrate in 1929 was 2,577,200 metric
tons, against 2,525,700 in ly2a. However, in spite of the
increased sales, stocks at the end of the year were higher
than at the end of the previous year. (62)
In 1929 the Chilean Nitrate Producers' Association
changed the entire plan of marketing of nitrates, except
for the United States. Formerly the nitrate had been sold
by brokers in Chile; under the new plan, there was direct
distribution from producing companies to exporters, doing
away with the added cost of brokerage. Distribution was
governed by a sales commission in London, composed of two
representatives of the Chilean government, and one dele-
gate from each of the four leading producers of Chile.
This was still another plan by which Chilean producers
hoped to bring their prices down to where they could com-
pete more favorably with the synthetic producers. (63)
The Chilean Nitrate Producers 1 Association was dls-
(62) Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter; Mr 10, '30; p. 60.
(63) Ibid. F 3, '30; p. 52.

46
solved on June 30, 1931 as part of a government scheme for
the reorganization of the industry. With the dissolution
of the Association, the Chile Nitrate of Soda Education
Bureau automatically ceased to exist, as it was part of
the Association. Its work was continued by the huge com-
bine "Cosach", under the direction of a new corporation,
the Chilean Nitrate Educational Bureau, Inc., with offi-
ces in New York City. (64)
During the first part of 1932, Chile was making ne-
gotiations with Russia whereby the former hoped to ex-
change from 50,000 to 100,000 tons of nitrates for Rus-
sian gasoline, lubricating oil and fuel oil of the same
value. If the deal had gone through, it would have made
business worth about $1,250,000. The deal struck a snag,
however, when it was found that Cosach, the nitrate com-
bine, did not have it among its powers to act as a distrib-
utor for oils and gasoline. So the Russian products would
have done it no good if it had taken them. Cosach made
offers both to the West India Oil Company (Standard) and
to Shell-Mexican Petroleum of Chile Ltd. , to try to get
them either to purchase the Russian products or to act as
distributors for them; but both companies refused. Then
there was a suggestion that the government of Chile ac-
cept the Russian petroleum products instead of the large
periodic cash payments due it from Cosach. This proposal
seemed to find more favor than the other, perhaps due to
the fact that the government was thinking of establishing
an oil monopoly in Chile, but up until June of 1933, there
(64) oil, Paint and Drug Reporter; Jl 27, '31; p. 39
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had been nothing done on the Chilean-Russian exchange
.
(65)
The real slump of Chilean nitrates came in 1932. In
that year sulphate of ammonia, the principal competitor of
Chilean nitrates, was selling in the United States for
just about one-half the price of nitrate of soda. Chile
was relying for a long time on the hope that European
producers would get together and really cut down produc-
tion and raise prices; but the inability of European pro-
ducers to stick together long enough to accomplish any-
thing in the line of price stabilization finally result-
ed in leaving Chilean nitrates entirely shut out of all
important world markets. (66) The international agree-
ment of July, 1932 did much to save the Chilean industry
from ruin, Chile in that agreement being awarded 30$ of
the world nitrate quota for one year. (67)
In order to get her industries through the hard
times, Chile, in 1932, had to grant liberal credits to
the nitrate companies. A governmental decree of July 4,
1932 established the Industrial Credit Institute, with a
backing of 40,000,000 pesos. Of this amount, 10,000,000
pesos might be used to aid the nitrate industry in the
form of loans. Another decree published In August of the
same year increased the funds of the Institute to
55,000,000 pesos, of which 25,000,000 were to be available
to the nitrate industry, for use in operations. (6b)
(65) Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter; Ap 18, '32; p. 16.
(66) Ibid. Je 27 / 32;
(67) Ibid. Ag 29/32; p. 14
(6b) Ibid. S 26, '32; p. 51.
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In 1932, Chile experienced a short wheat crop. The
country usually supplies all its own requirements in that
regard, but the crop for 1932 was Insufficient for domes-
tic consumption. As the country had little money with
which to purchase wheat from other parts of the world, it
tried to negotiate an exchange with other countries, in
which it hoped to swap some of its nitrates for wheat. It
approached the Federal Farm Board in the United States, but
the two groups were unable to come to any understanding.
The trouble was that the Farm Board would have no use for
the nitrates, the situation being somewhat similar to the
one in which the Chilean combine, Cosach, found itself with
regard to the Russian petroleum barter in the first part
of 1932. (69)
The suggestion was then made that the United States
War Department take the nitrates off the hands of the Farm
Board, to be stored for future use in war. After a special
investigation of the situation on the part of the Depart-
ment, it was stated that there was no need of further
stocks of nitrates in this country for war purposes. It
was claimed that the stocks already on hand, together with
the capacity of American plants, would be more than enough
to meet even the most stringent emergency. As a protection
to firms selling nitrates for agriculture, it was proposed
that the War Department take the addition"'nitrates (amount-
ing to some 40,000 tons) and sterilize them, making them
unfit for agriculture, in case the government should try
at some future date to sell them on the open market.
(69) See page 46 Chilean-Russian petroleum exchange.
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This last suggestion was flatly turned down, with a state-
ment to the effect that such a thing "had never been done
before".
A direct swap between the American agricultural coop-
erative societies of the wheat farmers and the Chilean
nitrate producers was not possible, because there is very-
little nitrogenous fertilizer used by the wheat farmers;
the greater part of our domestic consumption is used in
the cotton fields.
All American producers of nitrates voiced their pro-
test to the proposed exchange, as it would cut heavily
into their home markets. Strangely enough, the Chilean
combine Cosach also objected strongly; it was afraid that
the exchange would serve to cut down its cash markets in
the United States, and it could not afford to lose any
cash sales. (70)
Although it has previously been shown that Chile is
constantly becoming less dependent upon nitrates as a
source of government revenue, the provisional government,
on October 5, 1932, resolved to push export sales of ni-
trates in order to build up balances before taking any o-
ther steps in its plans for internal improvement. This
alone would tend to show that the acclaimed "independence"
of Chile from nitrates is still a myth, and that without
that source of revenue there would have to be drastic cur-
tailments in standards in the country. (71)
(70) Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter; Ag 29, '32; p. 14.
(71) Ibid. 10,'32; p. 44.
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Under a six-months modus Vivendi of November 11, 1932,
Argentina granted to Chile a reduction of one-half of the
import duties charged against certain Chilean products,
nitrate of soda being among them. Shortly afterward the
commercial attache" at Buenos Aires cabled the United States
Department of Commerce that all such concessions were to
be revoked, the revocation to become effective on February
11, 1933. (72) Thus ended another short breathing spell,
during which Chile was able to get some of its nitrates
upon foreign markets.
Because of the dire situation in Chile during the
first part of 1933, near-desperate measures were proposed
by several of the larger companies in order to be able to
lower their prices sufficiently so as to compete in gen-
eral world markets. The suggestions came about during a
meeting of the Lautaro Nitrate Corporation in February,
that company being the liquidating agent for the Cosach
combine. (73) Although the Chilean Congress was not in
favor of the proposal, directors of Lautaro asked that
all export taxes be called off, and that Chilean nitrates
be freed from the charge of 37.50 per ton which had been
assessed in order to cover service on prior secured bonds
of Cosach. In no other way, it was said, could the ni-
trate industry of Chile hope to survive. (74-)
(72) Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter; F 20 ,'33; p. 14.
(73) Cosach had by this time been placed in liquidation,
with provision being made for the payment of interest
on its bonds. Complete discussion of this combine and
its affairs will come under a separate section immed-
iately following this discussion of the general Chil-
ean situation.
(74-) Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter; Mr 13, '33; p. 22.
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THE COSACH COMBINATION:
The CompaKia de Salitre de Chile, or, as it is almost
universally spoken of, "Cosach", was the largest corpora-
tion ever to he formed in South America. On July 21, 1930,
President Ibattez of Chile signed the law (75) which
served to create the huge combine.
The purposes for which Cosach was formed are given as
follows: (76)
"1. To attend to the general interest of the industry
and commerce of nitrates and by-products;
2. To attain by means of a central organization im-
provement of the industry and commerce of nitrates and u-
tilization of by-products, and to favor technical and sci-
entific investigation as well as the establishment of ex-
perimental schools and plants for this purpose;
3. To carry out the propaganda, sale and distribution
of nitrate and its by-products;
4. To facilitate transportation and handling of all
products related to the nitrate industry, as well as arti-
cles required by the industry;
5. To centralize the acquisition of articles and mer-
chandise referred to immediately above, giving preference
to Chilean products;
6. To survey, acquire and exploit nitrate lands; to
acquire and operate nitrate plants; to market the products
(75) Chilean Law Number 4863, of July 21, 1930.
(76) From the DIARIO OFICIAL for July 21, 1930. Repro-
duced in English in the Bulletin of the Pan American
Union for May, 1931; pp. 515-16.

manufactured, and to enter into any kind of contracts for
the production, exploitation, sale, consignment, transpor-
tation and freightage of nitrate and by-products, and in
general any contracts related directly to the industry and
commerce of nitrate and the attainment of all other objec-
tives established under the present law."
The Anglo-Chilean's contribution to Cosach of the
right to use its Guggenheim Process was the largest sin-
gle item of investment in the combine. The formation of
Cosach was delayed for some time because of inability of
the parties concerned to agree upon the price to be paid
for the process. (77)
Cosach, which was organized for a period of 60 years
as a stock company, was capitalized at 3,000,000,000
Chilean pesos, which amounts to about 065,000,000 in
American money. The shares were divided into Classes A
and B, the amounts outstanding of which were at all times
to be kept equal. There were 30,000,000 shares of 100
pesos each, of which 15,000,000 were in each class. All
of the Class A shares went to the Government of Chile, in
return for which the Government transferred to Cosach the
title to fields estimated to contain 150,000,000 tons of
nitrates. Title to other fields was kept by the Govern-
ment, but it reserved the right to sell to Cosach the
products of those fields at 10 pesos ($1.21) per ton.
The B shares went to the companies whose assets and liabil-
(77) Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter; D 22,'30; p. 19.
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ities were taken over by Cosach. Other Class B shares
were to be issued as required, with a corresponding issue
of Class A shares. The Class B holders were also required
to take at least 5,000,000 shares of 1% preferred stock.
The Class B holders were to elect 7 directors, and
the preferred holders were to elect 1 director for a term
of 1 year; the President of Chile was to appoint 4 direct-
ors for terms of 6 years each.
With the formation of Cosach, the Government agreed
to exempt all of its nitrate and iodine from the export
tax, and also agreed to exempt its dividends from taxa-
tion. The income tax of the company was fixed at b%. In
return, Cosach guaranteed the Government dividends of from
140,000,000 to 186,000,000 annually over a period of four
years
.
The Government was to pay for its Class A shares in
cash; or, if the deposits transferred to Cosach contained
more than 150,000,000 tons of nitrate, by selling the ex-
cess to Cosach. (78)
Original plans for Cosach were to construct two large
new plants. Because of the situation in the industry,
such plans were scrapped immediately, the combine deciding
to get along with plants already in existence. I The schedule
was also revised to provide for funding of the payments to
the Chilean Government. (79)
(78) Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter; Je 2, '30; p. 21.
Bulletin of Pan American Union; May,'31; p. 517.
(79) Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter; Mr 9, '31; p. 44.
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In the latter part of 1931, a Chilean committee made
a report to the government as to their grievances in re-
gard to Cosach. They claimed, first of all, that the cor-
poration was unconstitutional in the first place. They
further claimed that the only reason for its formation was
for the paying of debts contracted by American interests
in Chile because of the expensive installations of the
Guggenheim process. It was also charged that lawyers'
fees for the organization had been excessive. There were
probably two main causes for this Chilean reaction against
Cosach. The first was undoubtedly the fact that the
Ibanez government, under which the combine had been formed,
had fallen from power; therefore anything associated with
that government was understood to be bad for the country.
The second reason was that the people in general were dis-
gruntled over the loss of government revenue from Cosach
because of the agricultural depression and poor situation
in the world nitrate market. (80)
The full report of the Committee follows: (81)
"The undersigned committee believes that Law #4853
of July 21, 1930, was violated when Cosach was organized,
inasmuch as its capital appears higher than that author-
ized, and because it considers that the sense of that law
as well as the aspect under which the Government presented
it and the Congress placed its approval thereon concur in
(80) Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter; N 23, '31; p. 62.
(81) Report of Chilean Governmental Commission, rendered
December 5, 1931. Reproduced in English in Oil, Paint
and Drug Reporter; Ja 15, '32; p. 61.
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demonstrating that an equality of conditions, rights, and
benefits, which do not exist at present between the Treas-
ury and the manufacturers, constituted the immutable basis
of its conception.
"Were we not oppressed by the acute financial crisis
and the era of unemployment through which we are passing,
and the situation of the nitrate industry were that of
the year 1929-30, in which Gosach was planned, the under-
signed would not hesitate the total dissolution of the
Company, in accordance with the provision contained in
Article 35 of the Law, for the purpose of organizing the
industry on other bases.
"Excise taxes proposed for meeting in part the unem-
ployment which this would occasion, as involving the work
of extracting high-grade caliches, would in order to be
capable of functioning with entire success require the
organized existence of old companies, since it exists
only on an extremely small scale, and the disposal of suf-
ficient credits exceedingly difficult to obtain at the
present time.
"It would doubtless have been preferable for the
Treasury not to have entered as a partner into the organ-
ization that was planned, but to receive a certain share
of its profits and to collect a royalty on fields trans-
ferred to it, at the same time reserving its right to
take part in the management of the enterprise for the
purpose of harmonizing the aims of the latter with the
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general interests of the country.
"However, the fact is that it was not so done, and
hence in the present situation we deem it preferable to
continue Cosach, provided it be possible to confine it
within the law which created it, and provided further that
its debts be reduced and its contributions be revised, the
same being paid exclusively in shares of stock, in such
manner that distributive justice and fiscal and individ-
ual interests may be consulted and safeguarded.
"In order to confine the companies within the spirit
and provisions of the Law on the basis of complete equal-
ity between the fiscal contribution and that of the com-
panies, it would be necessary to convert into shares of
stock the bonds of Cosach, except those transferred to the
National City Company, which represent $19,000,000 , and
those placed in England, the Netherlands, Switzerland and
Sweden, amounting to three millions of gold pounds, and
further, those turned over to the Treasury, at the same
time reducing proportionally the 60 pesos per ton reserved
in favor of loans.
"With debts thus equitably reduced, they would not as
at present overshadow the future of the industry. It is
well known that those of Cosach were markedly increased by
the acquisition of part of the assets of certain compan-
ies, by bonds delivered to the Treasury in payment of their
quotas for the years 1932 and 1933, and by the transfer of
the credit of Guggenheim Brothers against the Anglo-Chilean
for fc 5,577,724 , which should not figure in the liabili-
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ties of Cosach, but in those of the Anglo-Chilean. (82)
"Payments for the assets of associated companies
should have been made in shares of Series B, and, there-
fore, companies which received bonds in payment for their
assets should exchange them for the said B shares, so con-
forming with the precise terms of the Law. (83) Outstand-
ing bonds should, as we have said, be reduced to those ac-
tually taken by bankers, which do not exceed ::34,000 ,000
,
and to those turned over to the Treasury.
"In their effort to relieve the industry, Seflores
Cabero and de Castro would agree to the elimination of the
latter.
"If possible, the contributions of the companies,
subsidiary companies included, should be revised, for the
purpose of adjusting their valuations to their respective
actual values, or of verifying figures already accepted
for companies i incorporated in Cosach, eliminating in lieu
thereof the subsidiary companies, which would continue as
(82) The debt to Guggenheim Brothers referred to is for
the most part made up of payments for the use of the
Guggenheim process for the refining of caliche. It
will be remembered that Guggenheim Brothers transfer-
red the process to the Anglo-Chilean, in which they
owned the majority of stock. The Anglo-Chilean in
turn, upon entering Cosach, contributed the process
to the combine. Leaving out of the question whether
or not the process was transferred at a fair valua-
tion, it will be seen that the Guggenhelms had a le-
gitimate claim against the Anglo-Chilean. Upon the
entrance of the latLer into Cosach, the combine took
over all the assets and liabilities including, pre-
sumably, the claim of the Guggenheims.
(83) This was clearly an infraction of the Law, as it was
specifically stated that all assets taken over should
be paid for by Class B shares of stock.
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independent companies, Article 39 of the Law being modi-
fied and their stockholders thus rehabilitated.
"Were either of these two courses adopted, the fiscal
contribution would be reduced or Increased until it equal-
led that of the individual companies, so that there would
be as many A shares as B shares.
"The interest of Cosach would be better harmonized
with national interests by requiring the former to desig-
nate within the period of ten years the fields which it
desires reserved and to which Articles 11 and 12 of the
Law refer. These fields having been selected, the Govern-
ment would be at liberty to dispose of the others, trans-
ferring them upon terms agreed upon to persons who apply
for them, provided the activities of Cosach are not af-
fected thereby.
"Without prejudice of the foregoing, the Government
would be able, in return for certain royalties, at once
to transfer to independent companies fiscal fields ad-
jacent to their present holdings, provided the said fields
were not commercially exploitable by Cosach.
"It is necessary to modify the application of Article
39 of the Law in such a manner as to insure the right of
the independent companies to operate and to guarantee the
payment of expenses common to the entire industry.
"It would be advisable for Cosach to distribute its
works, so that the ports of Tocapilla, Iquique, Antofagas-
ta and Taltal would be assured of nitrate and the working
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population employed in the same would be increased. For
the purpose of effecting this advantageous distribution,
it should be arranged that two works should operate in I-
quique, two in Tocapilla, two in Antofagasta, and one at
least in Taltal.
"It appears preferable in these circumstances and in
order not to increase the stocks, to suspend manufacturing
in Maria Elena, substituting for the same extraction by an
equal number of workers in high-grade caliche.
"We make this recommendation without committing our-
selves concerning the primacy of one or another process of
manufacture, since sufficient data relative to the super-
ior efficacy of the Guggenheim Process do not as yet ex-
ist. Only now an experimental plan is oeing outlined in
fields cubed for the Shanks system, which will be worked
by the Guggenheim method, for the purpose of detirmining
accurately the coefficient of both yields. Such an exper-
iment alone will enable us to estimate rationally the val-
ue of the Guggenheim patent in its double aspect of coef-
ficient of exploitation and development of tne fields.
"We would also recommend reduction in the high sala-
ries which the companies pay their directors and higher
officials, which are out of proportion to the present sit-
uation, and review of accounts submitted for heavy expen-
ses of organization of Cosach.
^Finally, in view of the structure of this vast enter-
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prise and in order that the interests of the Treasury, the
owner of all its shares of Series A, may be effectively
and properly considered, not only in the General Directo-
rate of Cosach, but in all its committees, it should in-
clude the representatives of the Government in sufficient
numbers, clothed with the power to veto any of its agree-
ments prescribed in Article 20 of the Law.
"Before signing, Sr. Cabero stated that in his judg-
ment the unemployment which might result in case negotia-
tions were broken off and Cosach dissolved could be avoid-
ed by beginning immediately the construction of the sec-
tion adjacent to Antofagasta of the railroad to Salta,
and by granting fiscal subsidies to companies which de-
sired to operate independently.
Santiago .. .December 5, 1931 (Signed)
In spite of the obvious prejudice which is shown in
the report against the American capitalists in Chile, it
must be admitted that the proposals of the Committee
seemed to be the only avenue of salvation for the nitrate
industry of Chile. The report seems to show a profound
realization of the problems involved, and a sincere desire
to find the best way out the fact that the report is
sincere is proven by the statement that some of the mem-
bers would even be willing to convert the Government-held
bonds into shares of stock. However, there still remains
the fact that Chileans always have been trying, and always
will try, to take over in some manner the interests of the
Americans in Chile.
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In the latter part of 193d, Cosach tried to float a
loan of #100,000,000 among the American bankers. This loan
was vigorously combatted by the President of the Chemical
Foundation. (84) He said that American savings should
not be placed in that undertaking, because, according to
him, there was an understanding between the Chilean pro-
ducers and the German synthetic manufacturers, which under-
standing was said to be in the nature of a combination a-
gainst American industry. (55)
Failing to get additional loans in sufficient quan-
tity, Cosach found itself face to face with a crisis on
July 1, 1932. On that day, its obligations to its bankers
came due; and it did not have the money with which to pay.
In order to avoid dissolution or bankruptcy of the organi-
zation, successful negotiations were carried out for a
year's extension of credit an extension which served to
put off for a time the failure of the combine. (86)
(84) Mr. F. P. Garvan, President of the Chemical Founda-
tion. On December 22, 193QL, Mr. Garvan sent a letter
to 5,000 bankers in the United States, urging them not
to so use the savings that the American people had en-
trusted to their care. December 23, a similar letter
was sent to members of Congress and to high government
officials in Washington.
Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter; D 29,'3(L; p. 21.
(85) It has been mentioned before that the United States
was not a party to the agreements and cartels between
the Chilean and European producers. Likewise, the
American market did not figure in any of the quotas
that were established by the cartels. It would be
hard, therefore, to see in what way the agreements
could be interpreted as combinations against American
industry. America is not a great exporter of nitrates,
and it was perfectly possible for home producers to
compete here with the Chilean and European products,
even as they did before the international agreements
referred to by Mr. Garvan.
(86) Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter; Jl 4, '32; p. 51.

The situation in which Cosach found itself in July of
1932 was, as we have said, the result of its credit having
given out in world markets. The American loan of one hun-
dred million dollars, referred to on the previous page,
was finally raised in February of 1931; hut instead of be-
ing for |100,000,000 it was merely for #34,000,000; and in-
stead of being raised entirely in the United States, Euro-
pean bankers had to be called in to take part of it. This
loan, of course, was in addition to the #32,000,000 bond
issue of 1929. (87) This new loan of $34,090,000 was se-
cured by a deposit by Cosach of 60 pesos for each ton of
nitrate exported. At this time there was no government
export tax, and Cosach could afford to pay the deposits to
guarantee its obligations. (88)
In 1932, when it was obvious that Cosach would not be
able to meet its obligations, there were protective com-
mittees formed of the creditors and security holders of
Cosach, Lautaro, and Anglo-Chilean. One committee repre-
sented the British bankers, and the other represented the
Americans. It was the purpose of these committees to re-
present their clients in considering any kind of reorgan-
ization scheme for Cosach, which was then understood to be
on its last legs. During the interim before reorganization
could take place, the committees did their best to protect
the interests of the bond-holders and creditors
.
(69)
(87) See page 44.
(88) Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter; Mr 20, '33; p. 53.
(69) Ibid. My 23, '32; p. 40.

63
In May of 1932, a new committee was appointed by the
Chilean Senate to make a complete investigation of Cosach.
The following results were to be determined: (90)
1. Whether the maintenance of Cosach was compatible
with the national interest.
2. Whether it was compatible with the interest of the
Government as a stockholder.
3. If not, whether it was advisable to continue it.
4. If Cosach was considered favorably, how was it to
be financed?
5. If it proved impossible to maintain it, how could
the nitrate industry be supported?
6. How could the companies not in Cosach be helped?
7. What other action could be taken to restore the ni-
trate industry to a profitable basis?
8. What policies could be adopted to continue the in-
dustry and better the nitrate situation?
All such committees and investigations were nearly
made worthless by the overthrow of the Montero government
and seizure of power by a Socialist junta led by Carlos
Davila, on June 4 of 1932. Davila was in favor of complete
dissolution of Cosach, with a return to competitive sel-
ling of nitrates. He did succeed in closing down some of
the Guggenheim plants and reopening some Shanks plants, both
to give more employment and to cut down the cost of pro-
duction by doing away with interest charges on the advan-
ced process. It was claimed that such a procedure would
(90) Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter; My 16, '32; p. 16.

64
cut the cost of production by $4 per ton. (91) However,
the government of Davila fell before he could carry out
many of his plans and Cosach continued on.
The long-heralded reorganization of Cosach was final-
ly agreed upon in August of 1932 and the creditors were
left out in the cold. The new plan called for the setting
up of a capitalization of $100,000,000 with £50,000,000 in
bonds secured by the Chilean government and by a mortgage
on stocks of nitrates. Creditors had previously waived
claims of some $40,000,000 in the thought that Cosach
would be liquidated from sales within three years. In the
reorganization, these claims of creditors were completely
Ignored by all concerned. (92)
In November of 1932, as part of the general reorgani-
zation scheme of Cosach, several drastic economies were
instituted. Its large Pedro de Valdivla plant was closed,
as it was thought that that procedure would be more econ-
omical than to continue operating it at only one-fourth of
its capacity. The laborers x.nat were thus put out of work
were employed in constructions and improvements that were
necessary to keep the plant in good condition.
Substantial economy In foreign exchange was effected
by reducung tne number of the foreign personnel, and by
cutting the salaries of those who were retained. The to-
tal saving realized in this manner was estimated at close
to #300,000 per year. (93)
(91) Oil, paint and Ltvlp Reporter; Je 2?,'32; p. 44.
(92) Ibid. Ag 15,'32; p. 16.
(93) Ibid. K 2i/32; p. 17.

Sr. Arturo Alessandri returned from an enforced exile
to take over the Presidency of Chile on December 24, 1932.
From its very inception, he had been radically opposed to
Cosach, and had favored its dissolution. However, upon
his return from exile, he watched things go from bad to
worse in the Chilean nitrate industry; and he then agreed
that reorganization would be better than complete dissolu-
tion, in order to prevent dire unemployment in the nation.
The Cabinet of the previous Government had agreed to fi-
nance the combination until December 31 all financing
after that date falling to the lot of Alessandri. Even
before his assumption of ofrice, he announced that he
would refuse to sanction an internal loan by American and
British financiers to Cosach, the loan to be secured by
nitrate stocks held in Chile. (9^) Evidently he believed
that the credit of Cosach was still good in world markets.
In a way, Chile had the foreign bankers by tne throat, as
will be seen by the following.
Alessandri was rignt in his belief that Cosach could
negotiate another loan in foreign countries. During Janu-
ary of 1933, it arranged to borrow h 400,000 from several
large banking firms. The bankers could do nothing else
but grant the loans, as about half of the money was to be
used to settle charges pending abroad, made up for the most
part of warehousing charges on nitrates the same nitrates
wnich formed the securities for prior loans to Cosach Dy
this same group of bankers. Thus, in order to protect
(94) Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter; N 2b, '32; p. 17
D 19, '33; p. 62.
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ttieir previous loans, the bankers had to agree to the new
borrowings. The latter were secured by stocks of nitrates
and iodine, and the margin was believed by all concerned
to be enough to protect tne bankers from any loss. (95)
As has been said before, the Alessandri government
was not in favor of Cosach; the combination was only al-
lowed to exist in order tnat the employment conditions in
the industry might not be too seriously affected. Final-
ly it was decided that Cosach had outlived its usefulness;
a Chilean law was approved on February 2, 1933 which pro-
vided for the appointment of a liquidating committee. The
committee was empowered to transact all business of the
organization, but it was to be free of all possibility of
suits rising out of its actions. Its obligations were to
have precedence over all obligations of Cosach previously
contracted. The committee was given specific powers to:
1. Exercise the powers of the board of directors in
transacting all ordinary business of the corporation;
2. Make loans or issue bonds in either Chilean or
foreign currencies, either with or without the pledging
of property of Cosach;
3. Conduct all banking, credit and discount opera-
tions that should be necessary, including customs and in-
surance operations;
4-. Make all necessary contracts, the said contracts
not to exceed five years in length;
5. Represent the company in legal matters with all
powers of attorney and the specific power of compromise.
(95) Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter; F b,'33; p. 15-
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Although the committee might give liens on property
of Cosach, it was not allowed to so encumber the Govern-
ment's reserves of nitrates.
In order to divorce the committee completely from the
former managers of the company, the Law stated that all
former government representatives or technical experts who
had assisted in the organization of Cosach, were to be
barred from assisting the liquidating group. This re-
quirement had its advantages and disadvantages, chief a-
mong the latter being the fact that no other persons could
help the liquidating committee as much as could people who
were acquainted with the intricate organization and prob-
lems of Cosach. On the other hand, as the combination had
been formed under another government, whose policies were
divergent from those of Alessandri, it was probably deemed
best that all adherents of the former government be kept
out of the dissolution proceedings.
The committee was directed to complete liquidation
proceedings within a period of two years; the members of
the committee were to be paid not more than 60,000 pesos
each per year; and rules were so arranged that two of the
three members would be able to transact the work of the
group, thus facilitating progress.
During liquidation, Cosach could not be declared
bankrupt, nor could any attachment be made against its
properties, nor could any court actions be brought against
it on claims arising prior to liquidation, with the excep-
tion of wage and accident claims brought in the labor
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courts by workers. These prohibitions were for a period
of six months, until proceedings of the committee had got-
ten established in workable channels. The same prohibi-
tions were applied to the Anglo-Chilean and Lautaro com-
panies, with the exception of such actions as might be
brought against either or both of the two companies by
Cosach itself. (96)
Mr. Medley Whelpley, President of Cosach, issued the
following comment relative to the dissolution: (97)
"Refraining for the moment from any comment on the
abruptness of the procedure adopted, which is surely un-
precedented, the pretended infractions advanced as rea-
sons for the dissolution, the apparent disregard for those
foreign interests who have made prodigious efforts to as-
sist Chile in its economic difficulties (98) and the inter-
national repercussions which a precipitate step of this
nature will have on the delicate structure of future inter-
national credit, it is an indisputable fact that the li-
quidation of the Compafila de Salitre de Chile has now be-
come a practical necessity.
"It would not have been difficult to reach an agree-
ment with the principal industrialists and creditors as to
the procedure that should have been adopted. But matters
having reached a sudden climax in the government decree,
the creditors and owners of the nitrate properties have
but two choices of action: one would be to resist the
government decree, relying on their full legal rights and
the protection to which they are entitled in pursuance of
international comity; the other would be to protest against
the principles andthe violent procedure adopted, but to re-
frain from taking any action which might hamper the task of
the proposed liquidating committee, providing that the ob-
jective of finding a harmonious solution justifies the
means adopted.
"For my own part I have no doubt that the second
course is preferable, as the first course would be merely
dilatory and would contribute no constructive thought to
the solution of one of the most complex social, financial,
and industrial problems of these troublesome times.
(96) Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter; Mr 6,' 33; p. 23.
(97) Ibid. Ja 23, '33; p. 19.
(98) This disregard was a continuation of a Chilean cam-
paign to oust foreign interests from nitrate control.
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"It will be noticed that the decree of dissolution
does not apply to the Anglo-Chilean and Lautaro titrate
Corporations, the apparent thought behind this being that
these corporations are separate legal entities, the con-
tinued operation of which is in the national interest.
For Cosach itself the objective appears to be to undo the
amalgamation of some 34- companies which now constitute
that corporation, a formidible, if not impossible, task.
I do not, of course, speak for the creditors and owners of
the properties, and it is too early to say to what extent
their rights may be prejudiced. I must frankly state that
it is difficult for me to understand the effect of a de-
cree which merely repeals the routine decrees giving life
to the corporation, and I have been unable so far to ob-
tain any satisfactory legal explanation, but the opinion
has been advanced in some quarters in Chile that the effect
is simply that Cosach is decreed to have been a de facto
corporation responsible for the contracts it has undertaken
during its de facto life.
"Moreover, I consider that these measures are contrary
to the deeds of organization signed, with legislative au-
thority, by the government of Chile. The board, neverthe-
less, will not resist thi3 action of the supreme govern-
ment, because it wishes to avoid all possible damage to tne
interests entrusted to it. Consequently, the board will
deliver the company to the liquidators appointed by the
President of the Republic, and by the President of the Su-
preme Court, but, at the same time, it leaves on record
that it eliminates all of its own responsibility for the
immediate and future consequences of this act of the gov-
ernment of Chile."
This comment would seem to indicate that Mr. Whelpley,
along with other foreigners in Chile, while not thinking
very favorably of the liquidation plans, did not dare to
come out in the open and challenge the government. It was
doubtlessly feared that were such a challenge to be given,
the government could find plenty ways of making life disa-
greeable for the foreigners. In such a country there is
ample opportunity for such disagreeablenes3 , as new gov-
ernments often absolutely refuse to recognize as valid any
contracts entered into by previous governments. So it will
be seen that it is often politic to go along with the dic-
tates of the government, even though not agreeing with them.
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Liquidation of Cosach involved among other things the
returning of the various properties to the companies which
had owned them before the formation of the combine. This
was an arduous task, as various liens had been placed on
the properties each one of which had to be treated in a
different manner. Leaders of the companies representing
the chief American and British interests in Cosach went to
Chile in order to be of any assistance possible to the li-
quidating committee and, incidentally, to see that their
own interests were protected. (99)
It was expected in official circles throughout the
world that the Chilean nitrate export tax, that was lifted
in 1931 upon the formation of Cosach, would continue to be
waived during the liquidation proceedings. (100) However,
by a decree of March 14, 1933, the government announced
that it was about to restore the tax. The reason given
was that Chile was in great need of revenue, and that the
tax would be necessary in order to enable the country to
balance its budget. As it was doubtful whether the com-
panies could continue to operate if they were forced to
pay both the export tax and the interest on their bonds,
the new move of the government was looked upon by foreign
interests as virtual confiscation of the plants by the
government. Further actions of the government in trying
to so order the liquidation that the G-uggenheim interests
should be separated from the other interests, was taken
(99) Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter; F 20, ! 33; p. 14.
(100) It will be rememoered that when the export tax was
lifted, the companies were required to deposit 60
pesos per ton to secure their bonds. Under the new
plan, companies had to pay both the tax and deposit.

to mean that the government was trying to crowd the Gug-
genheims out of the nitrate business, or at least that it
was trying to wipe out all their claims against Cosach
and its assets. (101) It would have also been impossible
for the large British and American companies to enter into
the proposed sales agreement that the government was think-
ing of to succeed Cosach, as the share of those companies
in the profits under the agreement would not be enough to
pay the Interest on their obligations alone. (102) Chile
had at last gotten the foreign producers just where she
wanted them, even though it caused her a great national
calamnity to do so. True, Chile did not try to bring
about the disaster in order to freeze out the foreigners;
such a procedure would have been suicidal. However, she
certainly took advantage of the situation to accomplish
what she had been trying to do for years.
That re'es tablishment of the export tax was the cause
of the brewing of a diplomatic breach between Chile and
other countries of the world countries in which Cosach
bonds were held, bonds which were now without security.
Several countries protested the failure of Chile to recog-
nize as valid the obligations of the previous government,
among them the United States, England, Germany and the
Netherlands. Protests were also made by private commer-
cial representatives of various nations. The general o-
(101) These claims of the Guggenheims were for their pat-
ent for the extraction of nitrate from caliche, re-
ferred to previously. Chile had for long been trying
to wipe out these charges and start anew.
(102) Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter; F 6,'33; p. 15.
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pinion was that Chile had violated a contract, and not
merely broken faith. The government in taking off the tax
and providing for the deposit for the bondholders, had
caused foreigners to finance Cosach far more heavily than
they otherwise would have done. They therefore took the
new action of the government as meaning a definite break
in the contract. The reply of the government was that Co-
sach had been formed illegally, and that there was there-
fore no contract, either expressed or implied. Foreign
bond-holders were referred to the courts for any further
satisfaction. (103)
There was talk in foreign circles of various repri-
sals that might be brought against Chile, in order to get
the government to accept the obligations of its predeces-
sors. Suggested means included the breaking off of dip-
lomatic relations, abrogation of commercial treaties,
tariffs against Chilean nitrate, and the confiscation of
foreign stocks of Chilean nitrate as security for the ob-
ligations. The latter course would have given the world
enough of a supply to last for two years and would re-
sult in completely killing the export nitrate trade of
Chile. However, none of these steps were taken; as it is
always a difficult problem to get many nations to agree
upon a single course of action; and without a single course
of action, the reprisals would be useless.
(103) Although the foreign bond-holders were given the
right to appeal to the courts, that right would do
them little goud, as the courts were Chilean, and un-
der the control of the government. If the foreigners
could get no satisfaction from the government, they
could hope for little from the courts.

The Chilean government asked for a list that showed
Just who were the bondholders of Cosach. It wanted to
know whether the bonds had been gotten rid of to the gen-
eral public, or whether they were still held by the large
banking firms; if the latter was the case, the negotiations
for a settlement would be much easier than they would o-
therwise be.
Until the end of 1933, the government of Chile had
not decided whether or not it would allow the payment of
export tax in Chilean paper currency. If such a proce-
dure was to be allowed, it would be possible for the com-
panies in Chile to put nitrate on world markets at a con-
siderable decrease in price, due to the current deprecia-
tion abroad of the peso.
The decree of March 14, 1933 restored to effect the
Law of 1897, which provided for a tax of 3.36 pesos per
metric quintal, the peso then being worth approximately
18 English pence. This tax equals about 100 pesos per
ton. (104) With the depreciation of the peso, it now takes
4-0 of them to buy an American dollar.
Because of this depreciation, Chile imposed a surtax
of 101$ on all import duties, and the surtax was extended
to cover the nitrate export tax. That meant that there
was a tax of slightly more than 200 pesos per ton on ni-
trates, instead of the former deposit levy of 60 pesos.
(104) That was with the peso at par 6 pence or" $.1216
U. S. money. The official rate of exchange set by
Chile is now &.06. while the commercial rate, as men-
tioned above, is 40 to the dollar.
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Before liquidation proceedings were brought about,
the 60 pesos per ton had to be paid by the companies in
gold, the amount being equal to $7.30 per ton, and being
used to cover the service charges on the bonds. If the
government were willing now to accept the 200 pesos per
ton tax in Chilean paper money, the total amount of the
tax could be gotten under present exchange conditions
for only §5 per ton. Such a procedure would enable the
producers to cut $2.30 a ton from their prices, but it
would make no allowance for the payment of interest on the
bonds of Cosach. By accepting its own paper money in pay-
ment of the taxes, Chile would increase its own income for
budgetary purposes, and yet not unduly burden the produc-
ing companies. If it will not agree to such acceptance of
paper, there seems to be no future for the industry in the
country. (105)
Plans for still another reorganization of the nitrate
interests of Chile were presented to the Chilean Congress
and to the nitrate interests in May of 1933. The new plan
provided for a complete fromCosach and from each other of
the Anglo Chilean and Lautaro Companies, and it also pro-
vided for elimination of the nitrate export tax which had
been fought so bitterly by the producers. The government
was to form a new sales organization to handle all export
sales of nitrates. The organization would buy all nitrate
from producers at a price figured on cost plus $1.50 per
(105) Above discussion of export tax adapted from article
in Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter for April 10, 1933.
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ton. Lautaro and Anglo-Chilean would under the proposed
plan get two- thirds of the sales quota for the country,
and the remainder would be divided among the smaller com-
panies, represented by the National Nitrate Company. The
government would receive its tax from the first 25% of the
profits of the sales organization, the remaining 75% to be
given to the producing companies. Out of this they would
pay charges on $57,000,000 worth of new bonds which would
be issued in exchange for certain bonds of Cosach. The
sales organization would acquire all stocks at present in
the country, at a price of 3 English pounds per ton. (106)
This new plan was not accepted by the officials of
Anglo-Chilean and Lautaro until January of 1934, when it
was voted by the two companies to take part in the govern-
ment selling scheme. The plan will not be final until it
is submitted to a vote of the bond-holders, which has not
as yet been done (February, 1934). As a part of the same
plan, the President of Chile has recently signed a decree
which gives the Chilean Nitrate Iodine Sales Corporation
a 35-year monopoly on the sale of nitrates. (107) There
is no telling how long this monopoly will last, before the
government changes its mind and decides to do something
else with nitrates.
We thus have the Chilean situation with Cosach not as
yet liquidated, but its successor ready to carry on as soon
as formalities are completed.
(106) Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter; My 15, '33; p. 59.
(107) LA PRENSA, New York; Jn 26,' 34.
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The estimated production of nitrogen in the United
States is shown by the following table: (108)
TABLE IX
SHORT TONS OF NITROGEN PRODUCTION IN THE U. S. A.
Year By-product nitrogen Fixed Nitrogen Total
1910 22,901 22,901
1913 39,330 39,330
1916 59,383 59,383
1919 86,960 276 87,236
1920 102,401 270 102,671
1921 73,501 200 73,701
1922 97,747 740 98,487
1923 139,550 5,910 145,460
1924 126,357 11,110 137,467
1925 123,600 13,050 136,650
1926 146,500 14,000 160,500
1927 152,000 18,000 170,000
1928 170,000 26,000 196,000
1929 187,600 84,000 271,600
Most of the nitrogen produced here in this country is
of the by-product nature, as will be seen from Table IX;
but since 1922 the fixed nitrogen industry has been grow-
ing by leaps and bounds. The by-products come for the
(108) Bureau of Mines Information Circular 6385, p. 16.
1910-1925, inclusive, from Ernst, Fixation of Atmos-
pheric Nitrogen, 1928. 1926-1929, inclusive, from
data compiled by Fixed Nitrogen Research Laboratory.

most part from by-product coke ovens, only a small portion
coming from the coal-gas plants. (109)
In 1928 there were in the United States only four
plants for the fixation of nitrogen from the air: being
located at Hopewell, Virginia; Syracuse, New York; Belle,
West Virginia; and Niagra Falls, New York. The plant of
the Atmospheric Nitrogen Corporation at Hopewell was the
largest, with an annual capacity of 30,000 tons of nitro-
gen. The capacities of the other three plants in tons per
year were respectively 12,000; 12,000; and 4,000. (110)
The Nitrogen Corporation plant at Hopewell (which company,
by the way, is a subsidiary of the great Allied Chemical
and Dye Corporation) was equipped for the production of
ammonia and synthetic nitrate of soda. (Ill) The first
unit of the plant, completed in 192b, represented an out-
lay of $30,000,000; in 1930 the company planned for a se-
cond unit, costing |20,000,000 which would double the
capacity; and the ultimate expenditure for the plant was
reported to be set at about *150 ,000,000 . (112)
Another great entry into the American field of nitro-
gen fixation came in 1929, with the establishment at Long
Beach, California of a plant of the Shell Chemical Com-
pany, which was a unit of the Shell Development Company
which in turn was a subsidiary of the Shell oil interests.
The plant, which was the largest of its kind in the West,
represented a proposed ultimate investment of &5 .000 .000
.
(109) Bureau of Mines Info. Circular 63b5, p. 16.
(110) American ¥ear Book for 192b.
(111) Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter; D 10
,
1 2b ; p. 51.
(112) Ibid. Mr 31, '30; p. 45.
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The Shell company uses late German patents for the fixa-
tion of the nitrogen, and the process is carried through
with electric power. (113)
In 1930 the American output of synthetic ammonia by
means of fixation was at the rate of about 500 tons of
anhydrous ammonia per day. At that time, the capacity of
present plants, plus that of those under construction or
immediately projected, amounted to 360,000 tons per year,
an investment of approximately #75,000,000. (114)
The huge Muscle Shoals plant erected by the American
Government during the latter part of the War to produce
nitrates for war purposes has lain idle for years, with
its machinery deteriorating and depreciating in value.
The bill signed by the President on May la, 1933 provided
for the use of the facilities there.
Aside from electric power production, the experimen-
tation with fertilizers is the outstanding peace-time
feature of the bill as signed. In order to cheapen and
improve the production of fertilizers, the board (115)
was authorized to manufacture and sell fixed nitrogen fer-
tilizers produced either by using the present equipment in
its present condition, by modernizing that equipment, or
by installing any other equipment or processes as it may
believe necessary. The board was also authorized to oper-
ate laboratories in which to experiment with different
(113) Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter; S 30, '29; p. 21.
(114) American Yearbook for 1930; p. 6ao.
(115) The TVA Tennessee Valley Association.
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kinds of fertilizers, and authorizec to donate fertilizers
to agricultural agencies for the purpose of experimenta-
tion with results.
Provision was made for the use of so-called plant
#1 for the manufacture of nitrogen; and provision was made
that in case plant #2 was not at present so neeaed, it
should be kept in stand-by condition for war use, unless
directed by Congress to the contrary..
Within one year after the passage of the act, the
President was authorized to lease the nitrate equipment to
any reputable farm organization or corporation organized
by such, at a rental of not less than $1 per year, on the
stipulation that the plants will be used only for the man-
ufacture of fertilizers. (116)
EXPORTS of fertilizers from the united States in 1928
alone amounted to 1,213,900 tons; 57% going to Europe, 26£
to Asia, and 16% to other parts of North America. (117)
Exports of sulphate of ammonia for the first 11 months
of 1928 showed a great drop over the same period of 1927,
as is shown in Table X. (118)
Table X
Exports of Sulphate of •"•nimonia from United States in tons.
Destination 1927 1928
Canada 3,119 3,063
Cuba 15,094 2,823
West Indies, Bermuda 3,678 1,055
Dutch ^ast Indies 49,257 35,313
Japan 29,839 24,229
Philippines 13,592 12,229
Other countries 17.455 10.379
132.034 89.093
(116) Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter; My 22, '33; p. 48A.
(117) Ibid. Je 10, '29; p. 56.. (118) Ibid. Ja 21, '29; p. 46.

This decline in exports was partly due to an increase in
the domestic demand, thus reducing the surplus available
for export purposes.
Table XI shows the exports of ammonia sulphate from
the United States for the years 1920-1933: (119)
Table XI
EXPORTS OF AMMONIA SULPHATE FROM THE UNITED STATES
YEAR TONS DOLLAR VALUE
1920 17.489 &2, 264.387
1921 65.915 7.620.130
1922 168 077 8 720.775
1923 144 645j. -1 r
,
9.805 417
1924 130,902 8,918,53b
1925 103,282 5,654,682
1926 l43,6bb 7,989,048
1927 195,766 10,137,340
1928 103,275 4,845,399
1929 104,117 4,817,394
1930 134,543 5,453,839
1931 66,902 2,220,265
1932 14,742 408,146
1933 14,328 3b 2, 42b
(119) Figures from 1920-1930 from Oil, Paint and Drug Re-
porter for F 26, '31; Figures for 1931, 1932 from FOREIGN
COMMERCE AND NAVIGATION OF THE UNITED STATES for the re-
spective years; Figures for 1933 from the MONTHLY SUMMARY
OF THE FOREIGN COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES FOR DECEMBER
OF 1933.

Because of the scare in some parts of the population
of a war with Japan, the rumor began to circulate during
the early part of 1933 that the United States Government
was keeping close watch over all shipments of nitrates
from the States to Japan. The Treasury and State Depart-
ments strongly denied that such was the case, although it
was admitted that the collector of customs for the Virgin-
ia district was keeping a strict check on such shipments.
Such a check, it was stated, would only be made a matter
of official procedure in the case of an embargo on muni-
tions. Nitrate of soda, over which the question arose,
has no official classification as such in export statis-
tics, being included under "All other nitrogenous ferti-
lizers"; although it is probable that soda nitrate makes
up the greater part of the classification.
Total exports of nitrates from the United States un-
der this classification in 1932 amounted to 166,951 long
tons, with a value of §4, 357, 3^3. Of this total, Japan
received only 14,617 tons directly, the remainder going
for the most part to Prance. Taking this fact into con-
sideration, there would seem to be no fears justified of
her receiving from us an unjustifiable amount of nitrates
which might be used against us in time of war. These
fears are made still more groundless when we consider that
Japan is in great need of nitrates for agricultural pur-
poses. (120)
(120) Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter; Mr 13/33; p. 16.
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Although this country exports considerable quantities
of nitrates, the net balance is very strongly on the side
of IMPORTS.
Table XII shows the total imports of nitrogen into
the United States for the years 1910 to 1929 inclusive.
Table XII (121)
Total Imports of Nitrogen into U. S. short tons.
1910 112,039 : 1923 166,095
1913 128,235 : 1924 185,796
1916 221,705 : 1925 223,764
1919 84,239 : 1926 199,400
1920 260,529 : 1927 191,400
1921 69,662 : 1928 269,000
1922 101,774 : 1929 239,500
The following tables will show the extent to which
the various nitrogenous substances were imported into the
country during specified years.
TableXIII (122)
Imports of Calcium Nitrate (Nitrate of Lime)
Year Quantity in tons Value in Dollars
1924 9,496 1379,580
1925 7,555 346, 2o5
1926 11,655 500,28b
1927 16,999 YY4,912
1928 23,373 999,947
1929 30,709 1,260,067
1930 47,233 1,697,009
(121) Bureau of Mines Information Circular 6385; p. 19.
(122) Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter; F 26,'31; p. 15.

Table XIV 1123)
United States Imports of Nitrate of Soda
Year Quantity in tons Value in Dollars
1871 25,1^5 $1, 254,961
1881 49,171 2,356,167
1891 104,813 2,929,760
1901 197,518 5,656,442
1913 586,315 20,713,375
1914 554,04b 17,926,165
1915 575,371 16,240,510
1916 1,072,833 32,129,9267 7 ^
1917 1,261,9937 7 ~* 44,428,1967 7
1918 1,608,569 70,077,674
1919 1,410, 7147 7 1 68,229,548
1920 907,141 40,314,969
1921 633,756 42,322,979
1922 303,2717 1 14,067,668
1923 897 , 198 43,062,754
1924 951,904 45,649,327
1925 1,104,8087 7 51,952,270
1926 1,020,4447 7 47,444,919
1927 64b, 0897 26,891,7127 7 •
1928 1,093,7617 *^ 7 40, 20b, 3627 7
1929 962,762 35,110,524
1930 692,592 26,471,945
(123) Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter; F 26,'3l; sect.p.l5ff.
For 1932, 1933: See p. 83A.
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Figure IV
(see Table XIV)
P S3
UNITED STATES IMPORTS OF NITRATE OF SODA, expressed in tons
and dollars.
Figures from 1671-1930 from Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter
for February 26, 1931.
Figures for 1931, 1932 from FOREIGN COMMERCE AND NAVIGATION
OF THE UNITED STATES for the respective years.
Figures for 1933 from THE MONTHLY SUMMARY OF THE FOREIGN
COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES for December, 1933.
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Table XV (124)
United States Imports of Sulphate of Ammonia
Year Quantity in Tons Value in Dollars
1391 9,950 §483,196
1901 14, 646 694,454
1913 61,113 3,b60,064
1914 53,597 4,900,053
1915 64,417 3,215,139
1916 19,404 1,371,007
1917 8,176 647,271
1915 3,953 467,999
1919 1,964 258,469
1920 2,586 343,107
1921 2,537 226,300
1922 6,356 314,269
1923 1,879 121,673
1924 5,551 337,032
1925 21,165 1,195,425
1926 13,340 724,067
1927 3,470 205,565
1926 33,201 1,474,305
1929 33,126 1,423,051
1930 6,092 2b3,6b7
(124) Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter; F 26,'31; sect.p.l5ff.
For 1931, 1932 and 1933: See graph on page 54a.

d4A
Figure V
(see Table XV)
(p tt4)
UNITED STATES IMPORTS OF SULPHATE OF AMMONIA, expressed
in tons and dollars.
Figures from 1891-1930 from Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter
for F 26/31.
Figures for 1931, 1932 from FOREIGN COMMERCE AND NAVI-
GATION OF THE UNITED STATES for respective years.
Figures for 1933 from MONTHLY SUMMARY OF FOREIGN COM-
MERCE OF THE UNITED STATES for December, 1933.
Note comparative fluctuations of tonnage and prices.

Table XVI (125)
United States Imports of Crude Saltpeter, Quantities
Stated in Pounds prior to 1924. and in Tons Thereafter.
Year Quantity Value. Dollars
1571 5,072,361 lbs. $208,423
1561 11,014, 22o it 414,630
1891 16,090,466 11 494,1217
1901 41,343,697 11 473,570
1913 10,989,362 11 288,995
191^ 3,5^7,252 11 115,470
1915 oil ,785 n 22,483
1916 5,412,130 ti 734,123
1917 10,171,654 tt 904,506
1916 8,715,327 M 956,653
1919 34,557,048 It 1,296,3917 7
1920 20,862,012 II 929,045
1921 30,868,7oo II 1,407,044
* 7
1922 6 , 208.779 II 189,569
1923 5,561 .009 II 168,410
1924 1,600 tons 102,017
1925 3 , 235 11 179,095
1926 11,869 11 675,134
1927 6,468 11 333,095
1928 7,692 it 322,710
1929 10,668 it 403 , 243
1930 12,104 11 599,068
(125) Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter; F 26,*3l; sect.p.l5ff.
For 1931, 1932 and 1933: See graph on page 65A.

65k
Figure VI
(see Table XVI)
(p 85)
UNITED STATES IMPORTS OF CRUDE SALTPETER, in tons and
dollars.
Figures from 1871-1930 from Oil, Paint and Drug Report-
er for F 26, '31.
Figures for 1931, 1932 from FOREIGN COMMERCE AND NAVI-
GATION OF THE UNITED STATES for respective years.
Figures for 1933 from MONTHLY SUM^IARY OF FOREIGN COM-
MERCE OF THE UNITED STATES for December, J.933
.
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Table XVII (126)
United States Imports of Guano
Year Quantity in Tons Value. Dollars
1671 9^,345 o3, 313, 914
1861 23,452 339,552
1691 11,162 194,167
1901 3,122 23,762
1913 16,462 313,891
1914 21,853 754,727
1915 20,950 534,371
1916 15,732 425,210
1917 3,563 73,394
1918 10,663 308,268
1919 8,218 293,425
1920 18,796 1,550,098
1921 37,578 3,156,064
1922 1,305 48,675
1923 22,883 912,240
1924 22,940 869,304
1925 24,553 737,896
1926 17,855 692,124
1927 20,579 834,447
1928 17,991 778,628
1929 39,968 1,964,465
1930 35,858 1,593,512
(126) Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter; F 26,»3l; sect.p.l5ff.
For 1931, 1932 and 1933: See Graph on page 66A.

B6A
Figure VII
(see Table XVII)
UNITED STATES IMPORTS OF GUANO
,
by tons and dollars.
Figures for 1871-1930 from Oil, Paint and Drug Report-
er for F 26, *3l.
Figures for 1931, 1932 from FOREIGN COMMERCE AND
NAVIGATION OF UNITED STATES for the respective years.
Figures for 1933 from MONTHLY SUMMARY OF THE FOREIGN
COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES for December, 1933.
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Table XVIII (127)
u. s. Imports of Calcium Cyanamid (Lime Nitrogen)
Year Quantity in Tons Value. Dollars
1913 14,656 ,777,774
191^ 29,536 1,590,004
1915 20,564 919,574
191b 35,023 1,633,366
1917 44,146 1,951,104
1916 43,070 2,297,475
1919 46 , 149 2,705,475
1920 84,678 5,534,716
1921 34,702 2.243,450
1922 a, 643 1,111,375
1923 57,678 3,086,271
1924 67,715 3,611,887
1925 90,761 4,252,918
1926 102,052 5,055,086
1927 92,153 3, 97 1 ,599
1928 125,907 4,597,957
1929 155,980 5 , ^09 , 89 2
1930 200,035 6,692,292
(127) Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter; F 26, '31; sect.p.lSff
.
For 1931, 1932 and 1933*. see graph on page 87A.

8?A
Figure VIII
(see Table XVIII)
(P 67)
To A/ J Hol/RRS
United States Imports of Calcium Cyanamid . in tons
and dollars.
Figures from 1913-1930 from Oil, Paint and Drug
Reporter for F 26,' 31.
Figures for 1931, 1932 from FOREIGN COMMERCE AND
NAVIGATION OF THE UNITED STATES for the respective years.
Figures for 1933 from the MONTHLY SUMMARY OF THE
FOREIGN COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES for December, 1933.
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Table XIX (128)
U . b . imports 01 urea i^ertn.Lzer
)
Year tcUantity in rounas value, i/Oiiars
17 ,9ol Jfc u 7nw$0, T9o
19112 A^A XT QOAPI ,99^
1910 ( 9 ,1 f ^
191 r XA oAx
191° OO r7 r7r7 T *7 ATP)17 , 4-79
I9I9 11, pro r ,09^
19 dxj IO , 09 J; 1U
,
( ot
19 ^1 7 71 A( , ( 1*T P,^^9
ly t xa 1 At
19 <0 19P » cUO Ar\ o7C
T oA19 <=^" 00
,
jlO AAo
19 lui , <^9i 1 d , ^KJO
ly ^0 pu^, fop , puo
19^7 ^C7 oAX Ax cm*0 ,P91
1928 768,438 47,508
1929 2,99^,430 159,956
1930 5,380,967 262,293
(128) Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter; F 26,'31; sect.p.l5ff.
This table shows the highly concentrated value of
urea, which is used in the manufacture of less concentra-
ted fertilizers.
Also there should be noted the drop in price which
occurred in the year 1922, when a great increase in vol-
ume resulted in only a small increase in value.
For 1931, 1932 and 1933: See graph on page 88A.

Figure IX
(see Table XIX)
UNITED STATES IMPORTS OF UREA, in tons and dollars.
Figures from 1914-1930 from Oil, Paint and Drug fie-
porter for F 26/31.
Figures for 1931, 1932 from FOREIGN COMMERCE AND
NAVIGATION OF THE UNITED STATES for the respective years.
Figures for 1933 from MONTHLY SUMMARY OF THE FOREIGN
COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES for December, 1933.
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During 1932, an American firm was given the sole
right to import genuine Peruvian bird guano into the Uni-
ted States. There was an agreement made with the govern-
ment of Peru whereby the American firm was enabled to im-
port the guano in cargo lots for unloading at either Gulf
or Atlantic ports. (129)
The year 1932 also saw a great increase in the im-
ports into the United States of sulphate of ammonia. This
nitrogenous material, by a combination of circumstances,
(130) was then so low in price that American farmers could,
by purchasing it, get from 50 to 100$ more nitrogen for
their money than they could by buying Gnilean nitrate of
soda. Imports during this period came mostly from Japan
and Holland. (131)
DUMPING- charges were brought against cargoes of Euro-
pean sulphate of ammonia for the first time in 1931, al-
though for a long time the American authorities were un-
able to definitely prove dumping. However, the charges
brought serious inconvenience to importers, as the customs
authorities required the posting of an anti-dumping bond
on each shipment taken into the country from the suspected
nations. This bond had to be large enough to insure re-
export or the payment of a special dumping duty in case
it was later found that there really was dumping. While
the cost of the bonds in themselves was low, the agricul-
(129) Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter; Jl 4,'32; p. 51.
(130) The most important of the circumstances were the
breakdown of the European nitrogen cartel and the depre-
ciation of the Japanese yen.
(131) American Year Book for 1932; p. 734.
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turists of the South began to complain bitterly that the
steel trust, manufacturers of nitrogen in this country,
were attempting to keep up prices of fertilizers, and to
place an added duty upon imports. (132)
The American Iron and Steel Institute, which was the
organization which instigated the anti-dumping proceedings
in 1931, later withdrew from tne scrap; but the investiga-
tions were continued by the government. In August of
1932, definite findings of dumping of sulphate of ammonia
from Germany, Belgium and Poland were made by the Secretary
of the Treasury. The findings stated that home producers
were very likely to be injured by this selling of the for-
eign product here at less than its fair value. Further
investigations were made to detirmine just what would be a
fair value for the imports; and in the interim, all import-
ers from those countries were forced to file bonds. Things
finally got into such a position that buyers were afraid
to purchase, for fear that tney would be charged a dumping
penalty. Dutch producers got af*ound that timidity oy sel-
ling their product here with a guarantee against any dump-
ing penalty. (133)
Dumping allegations were made against Dutch sulphate
of ammonia in 1933, but were held to be groundless. (134)
Investigations are still pending as regards the product
of several other countries. (June, 1933)
(132) Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter; Ag 10,'3l; p. 17^
(133) Ibid. Ag 22, '32; p. 15.
(134) Ibid. F 27,'33; p. 15.
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THE RELATIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT AND THE INDUSTRY have
for the most part been cordial, very little interference
having been indulged in by the Federal authorities.
The government intervened in the matter of prices of
fertilizers in 1920, under the authority of the Lever Food
Control Act. It was claimed in December of that year that
the prices being quoted by manufacturers for the spring of
the next year were much too high, and that they should be
materially reduced. Prices of farm products in general
were in the declining stage following the bourn of war
years, and farmers could not afford to pay such high pri-
ces for fertilizers. The high prices in 1920 resulted in
curtailment of acreage and in reduction of yield per acre
that was planted. (135)
In a case that was finally decided by the United
States Supreme Court on February 6, 1933, the Anglo Chil-
ean Nitrate Sales Corporation was awarded a decision over
the State of Alabama. Alabama had tried to tax the corpo-
ration under a state law which stated that foreign corpora-
tions must register and pay an annual tax of §2 for each
#1,000 worth of capital employed in the state. The only
capital which the corporation owned in the state was its
stock of nitrates, which were stored in a public warehouse
in Mobile, and which were sold for cash by a traveling
salesman working on commission for the head office in New
Court
York. The Alabama Supreme classified such procedure as do-
(135) New International Yearbook for 1920; p. 220
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ing business in the state, and so taxed the corporation.
The majority opinion of the United States Supreme Court
was that the company was not doing a local business in the
state, and consequently the only thing that the state
could tax would be the imported nitrate; however, that
would be a tax on foreign commerce, which is forbidden to
the states by the Constitution. The dissenting opinion of
the Court agreed with the State Court, saying that there
was nothing to stop the corporation from selling broken
bags of nitrate, and thus doing a local business in the
State of Alabama. (136)
In May of 1933 a request was filed by a Baltimore
company against the granting of loans by the Regional Ag-
ricultural Credit Corporation at Albany, New York to far-
mers in Maine who bought their fertilizers from manufactur-
ers in Canada. (137) The company claimed that such loans
served to keep Canadian plants running and American plants
idle, thus completely defeating their purpose. The letter
requested that the matter be presented to the Reconstruc-
tion Finance Corporation, which supplied the money for the
loans, and requested that the Corporation prohibit the use
of such agricultural loans for expenditure in any but Amer-
ican plants. (138
When the National Industrial Recovery Act, known as
the NIRA, was contemplated by government officials in 1933,
(136) Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter; F 13, '33; p. 54-
.
(137) Filed with U. S. Senator Millard Tydings.
(138) Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter; My 29/33; p. 53.
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the Fertilizer Recovery Committee, or FRC, was organized
by the industry on June 1. The purpose of the FRC was to
coordinate the efforts of the fertilizer industry with the
general recovery plans of the National Government. Econ-
omic and ethical aspects of the industry were to be so co-
ordinated so as to enable the members to formulate their
code of practices as required by the Government. (139)
During the past few years, the Government has had to
decide priority claims on many patents and inventions that
have been presented to it, but there has been only one
such patent that has had great importance for the American
nitrate industry and that was a patent for a synthetic
ammonia catalyst process, invented by an employee of the
Atmospheric Nitrogen Corporation.
The new process consisted of the passing of the gas-
ses to be synthesized into contact with liquid anhydrous
ammonia before entry into the catalyst chamber. The pro-
cess was conceived in 1919, and was reduced to practice in
1921. A patent was applied for in 1923. Application for
a patent on a similar process was made by another person in
1921, which was taken as the date of conception. The se-
cond person admitted that the other patent was discovered
first, but claimed that the company had been delinquent in
reducing it to practice. The corporation claimed that it
had to wait for the completion of its new plant to reduce
the invention to practice, and the courts in 1929 decided
that the Atmospheric Corporation had NOT been delinquent,
thus granting it the patent. (140)
1139) Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter; Je 19, '33; p. 48.
v 140 Ibid. D 30, ' 29 ; p. 21

GERMANY
94
Germany, as was shown by Figure 1A on page 20, is the
largest producer of nitrogen in the world, when the pro-
duction of the natural Chilean fields is left out of the
picture. Prior to the War, she imported practically half
of her requirements, chiefly in the form of nitrate of so-
da from Chile. Cut off from Chile during the V.ar, she de-
veloped her synthetic plants, until today she is the lar-
gest synthetic producer in the world.
"The production of fixed nitrogen in Germany has been
estimated ... at about 670,000 short tons of contained ni-
trogen. About 75% of this production is said to be fixed
by direct ammonia synthesis and 10% by the cyanamide pro-
cess; 11$ is by-product ammonia. About half of the re-
sulting products is ammonia sulphate, 13% ammonia sul-
phate-nitrate, 10% cyanamide, 10^ calcium nitrate, and h%
synthetic nitrate of soda.
"About 75;t of the nitrogen production comes from the
Leuna and uppau works of the German Dye Trust (I. G. Far-
benindustrie A. G. ) and 10% from the government-owned cy-
anamide plants at Piesteritz and Trostberg; 11% is by-
products from coke and gas plants. The Leunawerke of the
I. G. Company is the largest nitrogen fixation plant in
the world, having a capacity of 1,600 metric tons of pri-
mary nitrogen daily." (l4l)
(141) Reprinted from the U. S. Bureau of Mines Informa-
tion Circular 6365, p. 27.

"The German Nitrogen Syndicate, organized in 1919 and
renewed in 1930 for a period of seven years, includes the
larger nitrogen-producing companies in Germany, the I. G.
Farbenindustrie A. G. , Ruhrchemie A. G.
,
Gas-Verwertungs-
Gesellschaf t , and the Scholven Nitrogen Works. The syn-
dicate now represents over a million tons of nitrogen.
The I. G. Farbenindustrie A. G. receives an annual sales
quota of 750,000 tons of synthetic nitrogen and the Ruhr
companies a quota of 251,000 tons. The firms outside the
syndicate are reported as not of outstanding importance,"
according to the Bureau of Mines. (14-2)
The synthetic nitrogen production of Germany for the
year ended June 30, 192b was 660,000 tons of pure nitro-
gen; 420,000 tons being consumed in the country, and
240,000 tons exported. The distribution of the production
was as follows: (143)
Table XX
German Nitrogen Production. 1925
By-product 60,000 tons
Ammonia Sulphate 310,000 "
Cyanamlde 50,000 "
Nitrate of Lime 75,000 "
Nitrate of Soda 25,000 "
Leuna Saltpeter 70,000 "
Urea and Others 40.000 "
660,000 Tons
(142) Bureau of Mines Info. Circular, p. 27.
(143) Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter; Jl 30, '25; p. 37.
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In the latter part of 1929, a gas plant at Leipzig
developed a process whereby it was possible to produce a
20% nitrogen fertilizer at a cost which ranged from 60 to
70 marks cheaper than by-product ammonia sulphate. A gas
plant producing 10,000,000 cubic meters of gas was said to
be able to recover 150 tons of the fertilizer. It was re-
ported that there was a company planning to build a plant
capable of producing 25,000 tons per year. (144) (145)
During the period 1929-1931, the nitrogen producing
capacity of Germany increased about 20%, in spite of the
coming of the world depression. In spite of the increase
in capacity, actual production of nitrogen decreased to a
marked extent. This decrease was due both to the lessened
consumption because of the depression, and to new sources
of competition which in this period sprang up all over the
world to endeavor to wrest markets away from Germany.
Whereas the industry in Germany was operating at full cap-
acity in 192a, it decreased about 10% in 1929 to 90%.
This figure dropped down to 6ti% in 1930, and still further
down in 1931 to 45% of capacity. In spite of the cut in
production, demand decreased at a still greater rate, as
was evidenced by the stocks on hand at the ends of the dif-
ferent nitrate years. These stocks amounted to 300,000
tons of nitrogen at the end of 1929; 500,000 in 1930; and
550,000 at the end of 1931. (146)
(144) Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter; N 11
,
1 29 ; p. 48.
(145) This was in spite of the efforts of the syndicate to
stop further plant constructions in Germany.
(146) Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter; S 12, '32; p. 16.

The comparative condition of the German nitrate in-
dustry in 1930 and 1931 is shown as follows: (14-6)
Table XXI
Production, Sales and Stocks of Nitrates in Germany,
Measured in Metric Tons of Pure Nitrogen.
1930 1931
Capacity 1,100,000 1,200,000
Production 750,000 550,000
Sales:
Domestic 360,000 340,000
Export 190,000 180,000
Total 550,000 520,000
Stocks at end of year 500,000 550,000
Of the total German production of 550,000 tons in
1931, the Ruhr District produced 132,000 tons. In spite
of the fact that German production taken as a whole de-
clined from 1929 to 1931, the Ruhr production actually in-
creased, because of the opening of several new plants.
This was done in spite of the efforts to cut down produc-
tion capacity. (147)
Synthetic production of nitrate of soda was expected
to exceed 200,000 tons in 1932, as almost 150,000 tons
were exported during the first six months of the year a-
lone, mostly to France. The output in 1931 was 180,000
tons, and that of the preceding years about 60,000.(148)
(147) Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter; Jl 11,*32. p. 52.
(148) Ibid. 3,'32; p. 51. When speaking of German pro-
duction of nitrate of soda, one thinks mostly of the I.G.
Farbenindustrie A.G. , as that company dominates the field.
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German PLANTS were increased in 1929 through the
building of a factory at Waldenburg, Lower Silesia, by the
Prince of Pleas intereata. The company waa capitalized at
5,000,000 marks, and the plant was to have an initial cap-
acity of 15,000 tons of pure nitrogen, produced in the
form of ammonia. The plant was one of the first to depend
upon waste coke-oven gasses for a cheaper source of hydro-
gen than could otherwise be obtained. Before the erection
of this plant, the Silesian nitrate interests were depen-
dent for their ammonia upon the I. G. Farbenlndus trie . 14-9)
The plant of the Ruhrchemie was in 1930 extended so as
to produce 50,000 tons of ammonia annually the extension
taking place with the aid of an American loan that was
floated in June of 1929. This plant is another of the in-
stallations that use coke-oven gas hydrogen. By using
this process, they can produce ammonia more cheaply than
can the dye trust with its Haber-Bosch process, even
though the latter has the advantages of mass production
and the fact that their plants are already amortized. ( 150)
In November of 1930 another synthetic ammonia plant
opened up in the Ruhr Valley, theC-ewerkschaf t Ewald, using
an American process. That made tnree large plants in the
Rurh, the others being the Ruhrchemie and the Montcenis.
This new company planned to increase its capacity in 1932,
but the syndicate persuaded it to curtail its plans. (151)
(149) Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter; My 20,' 29; p. 51.
(150) Ibid. Ja 13,'30; p. 62.
(151) Ibid. N 10, '30; p. 29.
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On December 31, 1930, the I. G. Farbenindustrie de-
cided to close one of the large sulphate of ammonia plants
in Westphalia which it had leased a short time previously,
thus ending a strife of long standing among the German pro-
ducers. The reason for the closing was given that the pro-
duct could be more cheaply produced by the Company's own
Haber-Bosch process. Also in 1930, upon the renewal of
the nitrogen syndicate, the I. G. took over the production
quota of the Mont-Cenis plant. (152)
The state-owned cyanamide works at Presteritz were
closed in November of 1931, because of huge stocks of the
product that were on hand. The plants were opened again
in May of 1932. (153)
In March of 1933, the above-mentioned works at Pres-
teritz were sold to a Bavarian company, which had been
leasing them from the government since 1926, The Bavar-
company
lan did not plan to use the whole of the plant; part of
it was leased to the I. G. Farbenindustrie for the manu-
facture of fertilizers. The government received the pur-
chase price of the plant in three cash installments. (154)
Information as to the details of this transaction were
sent to the United States Department of Commerce by the
Trade Commissioner stationed at Berlin.
German EXPORTS of sulphate of ammonia during the
first nine months of 1928 amounted to 596,972 tons, an
(152) Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter; D 29, '30; p. 48.
(153) Ibid. My 9,'32; p. 51.
(154) Ibid. Mr 13, '33; p. 53.
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increase of 25% over the same period in 1927, and an in-
crease of 60% over 1925. This was also an increase of
950% over 1913, when the synthetic industry in Germany
was just getting started with its exports. During 1928
there was an increase of 31% in the free trade deliveries
of the sulphate, and an increase of only 11% in the re-
parations deliveries. (155) Destinations of the 1928 ex-
ports were as follows, expressed in metric tons: (156)
Table XXII
Destination of German Exports of Sulphate of
Ammonia in 1928 (9 mos)
France 139,505 tons
Japan 127,893 "
Holland 112,372 "
Belgium 52,597 "
Spain 41,020 "
Denmark 40,726 "
China 23,305 "
Total German exports of nitrogenous fertilizers in
1928 amounted to 460,000,000 which represented 1-5 of
the total chemical exports. The great reason for the in-
crease of exports in this field in 1928 was the ability of
German producers to sell Sulphate of ammonia, which is a
highly competitive product, in almost all world markets.
Of fertilizers besides sulphate of ammonia, the U. S.was
the principal purchaser, taking more than 1-4. (157)
(155) As part of the post-war agreements among powers.
(156) Oil, Paint and Drug Reoorter; Ja 21, '29; p. 46.
(157) Ibid. My 6, '29; p. 70.
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After the dissolution of the international nitrogen
pact on July 1, 1931, Germany, unhampered by restrictions
of the agreement, greatly increased her exports of sul-
phate of ammonia. Total exports for the first ten months
of the year amounted to 569, 9'6& metric tons, compared
with 436, 252 tons for the same period in the preceding
year. That the breaking of the agreement was responsible
for the increase in exports was shown by the fact that
shortly before its failure, the exports of Germany were
10% below those of 1930. (156) This same increase car-
ried over into the first part of 1932. (159)
German exports of nitrogenous compounds for the
first quarter of 1932 showed a tonnage decline of about
10% over 1931, showing that the effect of the breaking of
the international syndicate had worn off. During this
period, the chief export was nitrate of soda, and not
sulphate of ammonia as previously. (160) During 1932 the
chief losses of the Germans were in shipments to the
Oriental markets and the United States. (l6l)
During 1932 there was arranged an exchange of German
fertilizers and Egyptian cotton. Some 50,000 tons of
nitrates were to be exchanged for from 15,000 to 20,000
bales of cotton, the exchange to be on the basis of the
price of cotton on the day that delivery took place,
while the fertilizers were to be delivered at a fixed
price at intervals during the season. (162)
(158) Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter; Ja 4, '32; p. 16.
(159) Ibid. Ap 25,'32; p. 23. (160) Ibid.Je 13, '32; p.40.
(161) Ibid. N 7,*32; p. 60. (162) Ibid. S 5, '32; p. 51.
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Even though Germany has a large annual surplus of
nitrates, she IMPORTS annually about 130,000 tons of
nitrate of soda from Chile, which substance is preferred
for fertilizing the sugar beet crop. (163)
In the first part of 1928, the government of Chile
made arrangements to send into Germany up to 150,000 tons
of nitrate of soda, which amount it was hoped to sell in
the space of a year. These hopes were not realized, part-
ly because of the competition of the synthetic manufac-
turers, and partly because of the Inability of the German
farmers to purchase any more fertilizer. Great stocks
were left on hand in Germany, involving serious loss to
the promoters of the imports. (164)
During the summer of 1931, Germany placed high du-
ties on nitrate imports, and later restricted imports of
such materials from Chile. Chile retaliated by giving no-
tice that, effective on October 24, she would end the Ger-
man-Chilean most-favored-nation treaty of February 1, 1862.
Faced with this situation, Germany gave Chile the right to
import free of duty enough nitrogen to make the 1931 totals
equal those of the year before, and Chile agreed to extend
the treaty to December 31, 1931. Later Germany agreed to
allow free entry to 48,000 tons of Chilean nitrates up to
June 30, 1932, and Chile also agreed to prolong the trade
treaty until that date. (165)
(163) Bureau of Mines Information uircular 63o5, p. 27.
(164) Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter; jl 30, '28; p. 37.
(165) Ibid. F 8,'32; p. 24.
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In 1932, Germany found herself in a terrible predi-
cament as regards prices in world markets. Prices were
falling everywhere, and she could ill afford to compete
with other countries. She still continued to do so,
however, in order to maintain her industrial employment
at as high a level as possible. She could not raise
home prices to make up for low returns of exports, so the
export business of the country was carried on for some
time at a loss. That was the main reason for the import
tax which she put on nitrates in 1932 she thought tnat
by keeping foreign products out of her own markets, sne
could keep her home prices from falling to disastrous
levels. (I06)
GREAT BRITAIN
Production of nitrogen in England is more than enough
to supply all the requirements of the entire British Em-
pire and leave a substantial amount for other uses.(l67)
Most of the ammonia produced in the country is of a
by-product nature. In 1927, for example, the production
of sulphate of ammonia was 399,567 tons, of which 14-7,162
tons were from gas works, and 252,425 from such other
sources as coke ovens and iron Y/orks. (16b1 )
In 1930 there was an export agreement between Britain
and Germany which favored Britain of sulphate of ammonia
and Germany on other forms of fertilizer. (169)
(166) Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter; Ap. 25, '32; p. 23.
(167) Ibid. Ja 27,'30; p.4d. (168) Jl 30, '2b; p. 37.
(I69) Ibid. Ag 16, '30; p. 4b.
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The following table shows the exports of British Sul-
phate of ammonia for 1931 and 1932: (170)
Table XXIII
Destinations of British exports of sulphate of ammon-
ia for 1931 and 1932. Expressed in metric tons,
TONS
1932 1931
British West Indies 16,020 11,456
China 46,532 65,541
Dutch £ast Indies 12,516 10,376
Italy 39 1,607
Spain and Canaries 194,995 157,955
Other Countries 167,910 121,466
The large amounts shipped to Spain were due to the
fact that Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. received pre-
ferred treatment there, being a member of the cartel.
Fertilizer exports for the first nine months of 1932
were 18$ above 1931. Those exported were: (171)
Table XXIV
British Fertilizer Exports. 1931 and 1932
Short tons
1232 1211
Ammonia Sulphate 360,822 315, 861
Basic Slag 6,434 12,896
Mfgd. Guano and Compounds 60,014 50,042
Superphosphate 12.140 9.665
459,410 388,504
(170) Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter; Mr 6, '33; p. 45.
(171) Ibid. D 5, '32; p. 32.
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FRANCE
France did not start production of nitric acid until
1928 on a synthetic basis; but by 1930 the total capacity
of seven plants in Operation had been increased to 50,000
tons. The installations were putuup with the idea of us-
ing them to make calcium nitrate, and equipment for that
purpose was installed in some of the plants. (172)
A French deficiency bill of June, 1930, provided for
additional credit of I40,0u0,000 francs for the develop-
ment of the government nitrate plant at Toulouse. Of that
sum, 50,000,000 was for the expansion of the already-ex-
isting plant, and 90,000,000 was for the erection of a
nitric acid plant. The bill also provided for government
representatives in the management of the plants, in order
to keep them in stef> with government financial plans. (173)
Among other increases in productive capacity in France
during 1930 was the plant of La Nitrogene, which was start-
ed for the production of calcium nitrate by the gas oven
arc process. In the same year, the coal mine owners at
Lens completed the fourth unit of their synthetic ammonia
plant, bringing their capacity up to 20 metric tons per
day. Also during 1930 another company began operating a
plant near Rouen for the manufacture of synthetic ammonia
by the Claude process, using coke-oven gas. (174)
(172) Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter; Je 16, '30; p. 64.
(1730 Ibid. Ag 4, '30; p. 48.
(174) Ioid. 27, '30; p. 48.
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There was a strange situation in the French nitrate
industry in 1931, when the domestic consumption was about
twice the production. This was brought about by the fact
that overproduction in other countries of the world gave
French producers a scare; they resolved that they would
not get caught with large stocks on their hands. The re-
sult was that they did not produce enough to satisfy the
home demand. (175)
In 1932 France organized the Comptior Francais de la
Cyanamide de Chaux, capitalized at 200,000 francs. The
purpose of the new organization was to develop the cyana-
mide industry, and to find new markets. (176)
During 1933 France planned to increase production at
the government plants at Toulouse, in order to reduce the
unit cost of production. From a capacity of 40,000 metric
tons per year, an expanded production was planned to in-
clude 80,000 tons of sulphate of ammonia, 80,000 tons of
nitrate of soda, and 80,000 tons of"ammonitre" . (177)
Also in 1933 trance planned to spend bO, 000, 000 francs
in order to make herself independent in nitric acid. She
planned to build plants and lease them to private concerns.
She planned to spend 42,000,000 for the construction of
plants; 15,000,000 for shipping and storage of ammonia; and
3,000,000 for nitric acid shipping equipment. (178)
(175) Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter; Mr 16,'31; p. 42.
(17b) Ibid. S 26,'32; p. 51.
(177) Ibid. F 27, f 33; p. 4o.
(178) Ibid. F 27, '33; p. 15.
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By a decree of May 5, 1931, France set up an import
license system, both to protect local producers and as a
means of national defense. At the very first, licenses
were issued for the import of 50,000 tons of nitrate of
soda; and later it was announced that further licenses to
sell imported nitrates in France would be given only if
the importers agreed to maintain certain stocks in France
as a military precaution, to reduce the price, and pay a
large license fee which fee was to be used to subsidize
the synthetic industry in France. A further reason for
the new law was that there was a deficit in the commercial
balance, and more ready money was needed. (179)
The decree established a commission to regulate imports,
the committee being made up of both the manufacturing and
the agricultural interests of the country. As first in-
augurated, the manufacturers had the majority control, but
during the latter part of 1932 the control went the other
wayy with the agriculturists in power. This group was more
lenient to importers, as it was to their advantage to have
more imports and lower prices. (180)
American, Norwegian and Chilean producers protested
against the provisions of the licensing system, refusing
to agree with the result thit the law was modified to
some degree. (181)
(179) Oil. Paint and Drug Reporter; N 30, '31; p. 17
Ja 4, '32; p. 17.
(180) Ibid. N 21,'32; p. 15.
(181) Ibid. N 30,'3lp. 17.
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In October, 1932, a pact was signed between France
and Chile whereby the former country would get the latter 1 S
nitrate in exchange for some of her credits that were
frozen in Chile. That is, hQ% of the duty that was to be
charged on whatever allotment fell to Chile, was to be
paid by Chile in pesos the credits that were frozen in
Chile. The transaction would therefore have the nature
of a bookkeeping entry. (182)
A special provision in the French budget law enabled
the authorities to impose special fees during 1933 for
all import licenses covering products subject to quota,
and to fix the maximum selling prices for those products.
Merely another way to cut down imports diplomatically. (183)
JAPAN
In 1929 a syndicate of several firms agreed to pur-
chase from the government the right of making ammonia by
the Haber-Bosch process. Thus the Tokyo Nitrogen Corpora-
tion was formed. This corporation never actually manufac-
tured nitrogen, but collected a royalty of 2% on all im-
ports of Haber-Bosch sulphate of ammonia into Japan. The
company had to pay the government 500,000 yen per year to
encourage research. 7/hen in 1932 it refused to pay more
than 300,000, the government touk away all royalties on
Imports not exceeding 50.000 tons per year. (184)
(182) Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter; 31,' 32; p. 54.
(183) Ibid. Mr 13.'33; p. 22.
(164) Ibid. N 26/28; p. 48. ...S 5, '32; p. 51.
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Finally, in 1932, the government took away the patent from
the corporation. (Ib5)
In September of 1931, the Miike Nitrogen Ltd., capital-
ized at 10,000,000 yen, started manufacturing sulphate of
ammonia by the Claude process. The ultimate capacity of
their plants was 90,000 tons per year. The company had
bought out these patent rights from another Japanese com-
pany four year previously. They were to sell their pro-
duct through the company which controlled the sales of
British and German sulphate of ammonia ofi the Japanese
market, and also the sales of four other Japanese firms,
the Mitsui Bussan Kalsha. (166)
A permit was also granted the South Manchurian Rail-
way for the establishment of a sulphate of ammonia plant
at Dairen, to begin operations aoout the middle of 1933.
The capital was to be 25,000,000 yen half to be sub-
scribed by the railway, and the other half offered to the
general public. Capacity was to be 150,000 tons per year,
but operations were to be started on a basis of only
90,000 tons per year. (157)
In June of 1933 there was a 5,000,000 yen company
launched for the production of sulphate of ammonia by the
Haber process, with an annual capacity of 50,000 tons. (156)
(165) Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter; Ap 3,'33; p. 57.
(lab) Ibid. S 7, '31; p. 45.
(167) Ibid. Ja 23, '33; p. 20.
(188) Ibid. Je 12, '33; p. 18.
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In June of 1933 there was formed a company Known as
the Oriental High Pressure Industry Company, for the man-
ufacture of sulphate of ammonia by the Claude process,
with an annual capacity of 120,000 tons. It was expected
to take at least a year, and perhaps much longer, before
the new plant would be in production. Other Japanese
manufacturers of sulphate of ammonia were at the same time
planning to increase their capacities, the total projected
change being from 240,000 tons to 480,000 tons. (189)
Japanese production of sulphate of ammonia during
1932 amounted to 684,000 tons, an increase of 82,000 tons
over 1931, according to word from the Department of Com-
merce at Washingtom. In spite of the increase, the output
was far short of the estimates of 800,000 tons. Neverthe-
less, the estimates for 1933 were set still higher, at
900,000 tons. (190)
In July of 1933, there was organized in Japan by six
producing companies, a sulphate of ammonia production and
sales syndicate. Importers agreed to support it, although
they did not join. Members had to control production and
prices, those selling below a certain price being fined.
Amounts of all sales had to be reported to the syndicate,
which became operative on July 1. All rules were to be
subject to the approval of a general meeting of the ad-
herents to the pact. (191)
(189) Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter; Je 5, '33; p. 61.
(190) Ibid. My 22,'33; p. 44.
(191) Ibid. S 5/32; p. 51.
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In the latter part of 1930, Japan began to be a power
in the export field for sulphate of ammonia, showing up
first in Java. The German, British and Dutch producers had
gotten the Javanese market all fixed up between themselves,
with quotas and prices set when along came the Japanese
quoting prices about 10% below those set by the Europeans.
Considerable tonnage was gotten in this attempt, orders
being taken for delivery throughout 1931 and 1932. (192)
Japan later got such a good foothold in the Dutch
East Indies that of total bookings for forward delivery
during the first half of 1933, 80% were estimated to have
been gotten by the Japs. (193)
Japan is for the most part an IMPORTER of sulphate of
ammonia.
In November of 1931, in order to better regulate the
quantity of the material coming into the country, an im-
port licensing system was established. (194) In order to
get an import license, one had to give information as to
quantities, time of shipment and time of import. Similar
information was also required of all who desired to export
Japanese sulphate of ammonia. At the same time it was
made obligatory for all producers inside the country to
make periodic reports as to their monthly output. (195)
The licensing system was revoked in the latter part of
(192) Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter; Ja 5, '31; p. 4-1
.
(193) Ibid. N 28, '32; p. 4l.
(194) Ibid. N l6,»31; p. 57.
(195) Ibid. F 1, '32; p. 61.
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1932, and Japan ceased selling any sulphate of ammonia in
foreign countries. She then became strictly an importer,
and a relatively heavy one, at that. With the dropping
of the license system, she jacked the home market price
up from 65 to 90 yen per ton. (196)
In March of 1933 there was felt in Japan an acute
shortage of sulphate of ammonia, with the result that an
importing company planned to take in 25,000 tons during
April and May. 12,000 tons were to go to Japan proper;
5,000 tons were to be sent to Korea; and 5,000 tons into
Formosa. (197)
BELGIUM
This little country, when its size is taken into con-
sideration, is a heavy exporter of nitrogenous fertilizer
materials. Table XXV shows the exports for the first nine
months of the years in question of the principal product,
sulphate of ammonia: (19#)
Table XXV
Belgian Exports of Sulphate of Ammonia in 1931. 193$
Tons
Destinations 1931 1930
France 6,795 14,542
Germany 31,677 3,713
Netherlands 13,599 4,530
Spain 14,247 a, 134
United States 17,96d 5,742
Other countries 15.245 21.744
102,531 5b, 405
Footnotes on next page.
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Although a heavy exporter, Belgium is also a substan-
tial importer of sulphate of ammonia, as is shown by Table
XXVI. An item worthy of note in comparing Tables XXV and
XXVI is that Belgium receives more than she sends lo both
Germany and Holland, for the aost part. (198)
Table XXVI
Belgian Imports of Sulphate of Ammonia for first
nine months of 1931 and 1930
Tons
Sources 1931 1930
Germany 19,418 26,631
Netherlands 35,351 0,065
Saar Basin 5o6 327
Other countries 9.137 12
64,472 35,035
In April of 1932, the Belgian and German producers
tried to bring about some sort of an agreement whereby the
production and sale of sulphate of ammonia could be regu-
lated. It was agreed by producers of both countries that
some of the plants would have to close down. The trouble
was then that the Germans wanted to completely close all
Belgian plants, paying the Belgian owners an indemnity.
This plan did not appeal to the Belgians, who thought that
some plants saould be closed in eacn country. Each one
was afraid to let the other get the Jump on her, watching
out for her own interests. (199)
(196) Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter; D 12, "32; p. 51.
(197) Ibid. Ap 3,'33; p. 57.
(198) Ibid. Je 2o,'33; p. 23.
(199) Ibid. Je b,'32; p. 34.

There were many different plants and processes for
the production of nitrogen in Belgium, and there was lit-
tle unity of methods among the producers. In order to
achieve some degree of standardization of technique in
the industry, there was formed in September of 1932 the
Federation Beige de Producteurs d 1 Azote, made up of the
leading producers of nitrogen in the country. (200)
NETHERLANDS
In July of 192b, the Parliament of the Netherlands
approved an increase of $1,000,000 in the budget of the
state-owned coal mines, for the purpose of the erection
in conjunction v;ith the mines of a plant for the produc-
tion of synthetic ammonia. The ammonia was to be used to
supply fertilizers to the Netherlands and its colonies.
Although an appropriation of only |l, 000, 000 was made at
that time, the ultimate cost of the installation was
placed at ^5,000,000. (201)
The first artificial fertilizer plant to actually
go into production in the country was one erected by a
steel plant, securing its hydrogen from the coke-oven
gas of the plant. Actual operation was expected to be-
gin in October of 1929. Although built by the steel
plant, a separate company was formed to manage the new
works, and rumor had it that it was controlled by the
Royal Dutch Shell, who possessed important patents
.( 202)
(200) Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter; S 26,'32; p. 51.
(201) Ibid. Jl 9,* 28; p. 54.
(202) Ibid. 1,'28; p. 49.
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In October of 1931, it was estimated that the produc-
tive capacity of the nitrogen plants in the Netherlands
amounted to 75,000 tons of pure nitrogen, which amount
was equal to 65% of the total domestic requirements. Sul-
phate of ammonia was practically the only substance of
which there was any appreciable surplus. (203)
Exports of sulphate of ammonia from the Netherlands
increased from 254,685 metric tons in 1931 to 377,022 tons
in 1932, the United States taking aoout one-half in the
latter year. Table XXVII shows the destinations of ex-
ports in 1932: (204)
Table XXVII
Netherlands Exports of Ammonia Sulphate in 1932
Destinations Tons (metric)
Belgium and Luxembourg 23,885
Canada 4,714
Central America and West Indies 33,601
China 2,931
Denmark 1,525
Dutch Indies 27,396
Great Britain 1,037
Hongkong 3,708
Oceania 5,500
Philippine Islands 4,177
Spain and Portugal 7b, 391
United States 187,907
Sweden 875
(203) Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter; 19,' 31; p. 26.
(204) Ibid. F 27, '33; p. 40.
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In 1929 there was established in the Netherlands an
agency for the purchasing of Chilean nitrate of soda for
the cooperative agricultural societies. The agency was
known as the International Cooperative Agricultural Pur-
chasing Association, and was affiliated with the Coopera-
tive Purchasing Association Central Bureau of the Nether-
lands Agricultural Committee. The Central Bureau in 1929
comprised about 780 societies, representing 70,000 farmers
in the country. In that year, the purchases of Chilean
nitrate of soda by the Central Bureau were 86,459 tons.
Total expenditures for foreign fertilizers during the year
amounted to 19,902,832 florins. (205)
POLAND
Under the terms of a decree of July 22, 1931, Poland
prohibited the importation of the following products ex-
cept under authorization from the Ministry of Commerce:
ammonia nitrate, ammonia sulphate, Chile saltpeter, sod-
ium nitrate from other sources, calcium cyanamide, and
all compounds. (206) This was done to bolster up the home
industry, which was in a weal condition.
The Polish industry and the intermediate credit insti-
tutions were afraid to grant liberal credit to farmers. To
help the industry, the government set up a fund of about
$673,000 , which it used to guarantee payment on such sales
up to 15% t payment to be made after a year, when it was
definitely seen that the debts were uncollectible. (207)
(205) Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter; Jl 8, f 29; p. 48.
(206) Ibid. Ag 3,'3l; p. 54.
(207) Ibid. My 30/32; p. 12.
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NORWAY
While a great producer of artificial fertilizers,
Norway has the markets of Europe closed to her, due to an
agreement made in 1927 with the I. G. Farbenindus trie
,
whereby the Norsk Hydro was to have the home market, and
the outside markets were to be left to the I. G-. (206)
Norway is chiefly of interest in this report because
of a new process which was discovered there in 1932 for
the making of nitrate of soda from seawater. The process
is believed to be based upon the extraction of sodium car-
bonate or some other sodium compound from seawater, thus
doing away with the need of importing soda ash. The Norsk
Hydro put the new process into operation in its nitrate
plant at Heroya. (209)
RUSSIA
Little is known about the fertilizer business in Rus-
sia. Because of its great needs at home, its products
seldom come upon the marts of international trade, and thus
do not figure in import and export statistics. Russia is
treated here not Decause it is necessarily an important
producer of nitrates,, but rather because it furnishes an
interesting problem a fitting way to end this discussion
of the current world situation in the field.
(208) Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter; F 6, '28; p. 63.
(209) Ibid. N 14, '32; p. 52.
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In February of 1929, the Soviet (jovernment ratified a
contract calling for the technical assistance of an Amer-
ican engineering company in the construction and operation
of a |10,000,000 factory for the production of synthetic
ammonia fertilizers. (210)
"Commenting on the Five-year Plan of the nitrate in-
dustry of Soviet Russia, the official organ of the chemi-
cal industry of Russia writes that the plan in its funda-
mentals has not yet been approved by the government, owing
to the fact that the main problems of the plan which have
been under discussion for the last three years have not been
decided upon, and they are still open for discussion. The
governing problems are: 1. Distribution of the nitrate in-
dustry; 2. Location of raw materials; 3. Methods of pro-
duction; 4. Products to be produced.
"The problem of geographic distribution and geographic
location is rather complicated by the vast and extensive
distances in the country. The consuming markets are scat-
tered all over the country and are at great distances from
the points at which raw materials are to be had. Scarcity
of waterways and poor navigability of rivers make it dif-
ficult to solve the problem of transportation, and points
which are favorable for the production of fertilizers are
in Russia as a rule poor consuming markets. Another dif-
ficult problem for Russia is the distribution of energy,
(210) Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter; Mr 18, '29; p. 4-5.
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which is rather to the disadvantage to the sources of
fertilizer raw materials; of definite value is the supply
of water.
Coal is the largest source of energy in Russia, and
95% of Russia's wealth of coal is to be found in three re-
gions, which are at a distance of 2,500 miles from one an-
other. These regions are the Kuznetz Basin, holding 70%
of the resources; the Don Basin holding 14-%; and the
Irkutsk holding 11%. The potential coal resources of Rus-
sia are estimated at 85% in the Caucasus, 10% in Siberia,
and 4% in Sakhalin. In other words, the fuel resources of
Soviet Russia are mainly in the Asiatic part, in Siberia.
85% of the power resources of the country are distributed
over an area with a population of less than 20,000,000
people, largely tribal. The area is nearly five ti^es the
size of European Russia, has a meager agricultural culti-
vation, and makes therefore a poor market for fertilizers.
The heavy metallurgical industries which are the basic
sources of raw materials for the production of nitrogen,
are located adversely to the coal supply. 96% of the heavy
metallurgical industries are to be found in European Russia,
namely, in the industrial Ukraine, the central districts of
Russia, and the region of Leningrad; while Asiatic Russia
beyond the Ural mountains contains only 4%.
It is evident that, from the point of view of the
proximity of the supply of fuel and energy to the location
of the raw material sources, the situation In Russia is not
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favorable. Another handicap is the problem of labor sup-
ply and the intercommunication with other industries.
Siberia and the Urals, both of which are rich in sub-
soil resources, as well as in the supply of energy, which
are vital for the development of a nitrogen industry, are
poor markets for nitrogen fertilizers. They participate
with only Q% of the country's total requirements; while
the western regions of Russia, the central black-soil
plateau, the industrial districts of central Russia, the
Ukraine, White Russia, Leningrad, and the North and Trans-
caucasus make up the bulk consumption of fertilizers of the
country. These regions are at the same time much behind
the Urals and Siberia in a position to produce fertilizers.
Converted into ammonia equivalent, the requirements
represent a total of 550,000 tons in 1933; 1,110,000 tons
in 1935; and 2,220,000 tons in 1938.
The above listed regions consume about 84% of the to-
tal fertilizer requirements of the country. It must be
bourne in mind that to supply these regions with nitrogen
fertilizers from the main producing points of the Urals
and Siberia does not seem to be advantageous, owing to the
high cost of transportation. Considering, on one hand, the
cost of transportation of raw materials to the point of
consumption where the plant should be erected plus the
cost of production of the fertilizer, and on the other hand
the cost of transportation of the fertilizer produced at the
more favorable point of production, that is, at the source
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of its raw materials, there would be a balance in favor of
the location of the production of fertilizers near the
source of energy and of sulphuric acid in preference to the
erection of plants near the points of consumption. At the
letter points, the cost of production will be much higher
because of the long hauls of raw materials, coal and sul-
phuric acid.
...Further suggestions are made of points suitable
for fertilizer plants because of their wealth of cheap
water power. These are the regions of Moscow and some
places in central Asia and the Caucasus.
It is to be expected that within the second Five-
year Plan consideration will also be given to Siberia with
its future hydraulic power stations on the Angara, or some
other water-power installations which are planned else-
where in the Urals and on the Volga River. It must, how-
ever, be bourne in mind that these regions are very poor
farming districts and are small consumers of fertilizers,
and therefore, it will be necessary to erect about 50% of
the nitrogen plant capacities In regions which possess less
than 25% of the water-power resources combined in the Urals.
Owing to reasons of national defense, which tend to shift
the central point of the industries of Soviet Russia east-
ward, the border states of Kasakstan, Uzbekstan and Dages-
tan will each see the erection of a fertilizer plant within
its borders.
i
The present nitrogen fertilizer plants of Russia are
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mostly operated on hydrogen from coke ovens. While it re-
mains to decide on the future methods of production in Rus-
sia, it is evident that preference will be given to the
Linde-Casale Process, and there is already a noticeable ten-
dency today to increase and develop the coke industry in
keeping with the demands and requirements of the fertili-
zer industry," (211)
SUMMARY THE FUTURE
The most significant change in the industry in the
recent past has been the transition from natural to arti-
ficial nitrates for the bulk of the commerce of the world.
With this transition has a concentrating of the produc-
tion of nitrates in the hands of the big powers. With
this concentration, and the desire of each nation to out-
do its neighbors and to become as self-sufficient as pos-
sible, there has resulted a dire period of over-produc-
tion and disastrously low prices a period which the in-
dustry is still in the midst of. These troubles have
been aggravated by the economic depression which the en-
tire world has passed through.
As for the future, I expect that the production of
nitrates will follow still more of a nationalistic course
than it pursues at present. Practically all nations have
industries the waste products of which could well be made
into valuable nitrogenous fertilizers, and it is only rea-
sonable to expect that they will be developed.
(211) Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter; 10, '32; p. 17.

This nationalization of nitrate production will be
but another part of the great struggle of today, when each
country is trying to make all that it possible can for
itself, and thus avoid importing in order to keep up
employment levels in the home countries. With the pulling
of the world out of the present depression, it is very
probable that this procedure will give way to one where
different goods will be manufactured by the nations best
fitted by location and natural resources for such manufac-
ture. However, I do not think that nitrates will ever
again be closely concentrated in fev: countries, such as
was formerly the case m Chile and Peru. Nitrates are
vitally necessary for so many things besides fertilizers
and war supplies, and almost every country (as has been
mentioned above) has industries whose by-products could
be used for their manufacture therefore I believe that
they will continue to be produced in all industrialized
nations of the world.
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